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COMMENT
EMPLOYEE PRIVACY RIGHTS: A PROPOSAL
INTRODUCTION

The employment relationship is one of the most fundamental and common
aspects of modern society. With the possible exception of marriage, no other
relationship entered into by an individual pervades his life so completely.'
Although a constitutional right of marital privacy has been recognized by the

Supreme Court, 2 an employee 3 in the private sector 4 has virtually no legal
challenge the recordkeeping practices of federal agencies, 7 represents the
him. Because the employment relationship can be terminated at the will of the
employer, 5 an employee is presently unable, without risking the loss of his
job, to challenge any methods used to collect information, the type and extent
of the information sought, or the subsequent uses and disseminations by the
employer of information that is often highly personal.
The Privacy Act of 1974,6 which granted individuals who are the subjects
of records maintained by the federal government unprecedented rights to
challenge the recordkeeping practices of federal agencies, 7 represents the
1. "We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for our means of
livelihood, and most of our people have become completely dependent upon wages. If they lose
their jobs they lose every resource, except for the relief supplied by the various forms of social
security. Such dependence of the mass of the people upon others for all of their income is
something new in the world. For our generation, the substance of life is in another man's hands."
F. Tannenbaum, A Philosophy of Labor 9 (1951) (footnote omitted), quoted in Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67
Colum. L. Rev. 1404, 1404 (1967).
2. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3. Throughout this Comment, the term "employee," unless otherwise indicated, will refer to
nonunion job applicants and workers. Unionized workers, unlike their nonunion counterparts,
may be able to bargain for contractual protection against an employer's excessive collection and
use of personal information and may resolve disputes through arbitration. See Craver, The
Inquisitorial Process in Private Employment, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 4-7 (1977); Summers,
Individual ProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 Va. L. Rev. 481, 483-84
(1976). Furthermore, as of 1974, unions represented only 21.7% of American workers. U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, Bull. No. 410, Handbook of Labor Statistics 293
(1977).
4. This Comment will focus on private sector employees because they are presently afforded
the fewest protections against privacy invasions arising in the employment relationship. Federal
employees are protected by the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976), which grants certain
rights and remedies to all individuals who are subjects of records maintained by federal agencies.
See pt. II(D) infra. State employees have also benefited from similarly broad privacy legislation
enacted in several states. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-801 to -810 (Supp. 1975); Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. §§ 4-190 to -197 (West Supp. 1978); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 66A, §§ 1-3, ch. 214, § 3B
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1978 & Supp. 1978); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 15.162-.169 (West 1977 & Supp.
1978); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1347.01-.10, .99 (Page Supp. 1977); Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-50-1
to -10 (1978); Va. Code §§ 2.1-377 to -386 (Supp. 1978).
5. See note 24 infra and accompanying text.
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
7. See pt. ]1(D) infra.
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most comprehensive federal legislative treatment of the rights of subjects of
the "information process." The recent report of the Privacy Protection Study
Commission 8 (Privacy Commission) has furthered the development of this
new area of privacy law by proposing far-reaching reforms designed to give
the subjects of insurance, educational, and employment records similar rights
to those provided by the Privacy Act. 9 There are, however, no existing
constitutional or common law protections for invasions of an employee's
privacy in the private sector, 10 and existing federal legislation provides only
minimal benefits in this area." In the absence of legislation, the outlook for
protecting employee privacy interests is bleak. 12
This Comment will argue that comprehensive privacy legislation protecting
an employee's rights can be formulated without unduly infringing on an
employer's legitimate interests in collecting and using information about its
employees. Part I will explore the privacy issues raised in the employment
context and the relevance of the legal nature of the employment relationship
to those issues. Part II will survey existing privacy rights and their application
to private sector employees, and will elucidate those general principles of
privacy protection that might be incorporated into employee privacy legislation. Part I will consider two existing models of employee privacy rights,
and Part IV will propose a legislative scheme granting rights and remedies to
protect an employee's interests.
I. THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
The term "privacy" encompasses a broad range of interests that can be
invaded in any one of the following ways: (1) intrusions upon an individual's
person, property, or private conversations; (2) inquiries into the private facts
or beliefs of an individual by, for example, compulsory, overbroad, or
surreptitious investigations; (3) the use of irrelevant, inaccurate, or incomplete
facts in order to make decisions affecting an individual; and (4) 13the uncontrolled disclosure of facts about an individual to third parties.
8. Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information Society (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Privacy Report]. The Privacy Commission was established pursuant to the
Privacy Act of 1974 to study whether the requirements and principles of the Act should be
applied to the private sector. Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5(b)(2), 88 Stat. 1906.
9. See text accompanying pt. II(A) infra.
10. See pt. I(A), (B) infra.
11. See pt. H(C), (D) infra.
12. A recent survey conducted by the American Civil Liberties Union discovered that
employees believe that their privacy interests are important and merit legal protection. The
survey revealed strong support among employees for several privacy rights, including a right of
access to their personnel records and a prohibition on the use of the lie detector. Westin, Privacy
and PersonnelRecords:A Look at Employee Attitudes, 4 Civ. Lib. Rev. 28, 29 (Jan.-Feb. 1978).

13.

The first, second, and fourth types of invasion are encompassed within the definition of

privacy offered in Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 Law & Contemp. Prob.

253, 254 (1966). The regulation of the third type of privacy invasion is one of the basic purposes
of the Privacy Act of 1974. See Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(b)(4), 88 Stat. 1896; Privacy Report,
supra note 8, at 17. The third type of invasion is particularly relevant to the relationship between
an individual and an organization that maintains records about individuals that are utilized in
decisionmaking, such as an employer, insurance company, or educational institution. See id.
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The employment relationship is unique because the close and continuing
relationship between an employer and employee presents many situations in
which the employee's privacy may be invaded in any of the aforementioned
ways. These invasions can occur during the four analytically distinct stages of
the information process: (1) the initial collection of information about an
individual; (2) the subsequent storage and maintenance of the information; (3)
the employer's internal use of the information in making decisions concerning
the individual; and (4) the employer's dissemination of the information to
outside parties.
The collection of information begins when an individual applies for a job.
Prior to being hired, a prospective employee will ordinarily complete an
application form requesting his employment, financial, medical, and criminal
histories, and he will probably be evaluated by an interviewer. 14 He might
also be required to submit to a physical examination or take psychological,
vocational, and lie detector tests. Is In addition to the information provided by
the applicant, the employer may also seek information about him from third
parties by, for example, requesting references from a previous employer 16 or
obtaining a report from a credit agency.' 7 During this initial collection
process, the first type of privacy invasion may occur if the applicant is
subjected to collection methods that are unnecessarily intrusive. The second
type of invasion will occur when he is required to divulge information
concerning sexual matters or political beliefs.
The collection of information is not limited to the prehiring stage. Once
employment begins, a variety of records about the employee are generated.
These records may include such job-related information as performance
evaluations, payroll data, various reports necessitated by government regulations, and records relating to fringe benefits, such as pension and health
insurance programs. 8 Some employers, seeking to improve their efficiency or
to ferret out employee-thieves, may observe employees through the use of
closed circuit television and undercover investigators, 19 or conduct searches of
employees' desks and lockers. 20 Although the collection of job-related information is generally useful and necessary, some of these methods of collection
are often overly intrusive.
The information that has been collected by the employer will be maintained
in some type of recordkeeping system, either manual or computerized. 2 1 The
14. See generally Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 223; S. Astor, Loss Prevention: Controls
and Concepts 72-78 (1978).
15. See Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 223; S. Astor, supra note 14, at 78-79.
16. See Comment, QualifiedPrivilege to Defane Employees and Credit Applicants, 12 Harv.
C.R-C.L. L. Rev. 143, 146 (1977).
17. See Note, Protecting Privacy in Credit Reporting, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 550, 553 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Protecting Privacy].
18. Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 225-26.
19.

S. Astor, supra note 14, at 20-21, 89-101.

20. See Ben Scheiber, Tests and Questionnaires in the Labor-Managenent Relationship, 20
Lab. L.J. 695, 696 (1969).
21. See A. Westin & M. Baker, Databanks in a Free Society 9-10 (1972). In some companies,
typically smaller ones, all of the information will be located in one central file. In larger
organizations, information may be decentralized among various departments, such as personnel
and security. Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 225.
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information will be available to persons within the company who will use it to
make decisions affecting the employee. To the extent that any of the information used in making these decisions is inaccurate, irrelevant, or incomplete,
the third type of privacy invasion will occur. The fourth type of invasion, the
uncontrolled disclosure of personal facts, may also occur when individuals in
the company gain access to information about an employee that they have no
22
need to know.
This fourth type of invasion may also result when an employer disseminates
any of the information that he has gathered for internal use to outside parties
such as credit agencies, subsequent employers, or government agencies. The
vast quantity of personal data maintained by an employer that can be
disclosed creates a danger of long-term damage to an employee who believed
that he was supplying the information for a specific employer's purposes,
only to discover years later that other prospective employers and credit
agencies were freely granted access to the information. The employee may
find that, as a result of these disclosures, he is denied credit or subsequent
employment. 23 Without any control over the type of information gathered or
its subsequent uses, the employee's interest in keeping certain facts private is
protected solely by the unrestricted discretion of the employer.
The legal nature of the employment relationship has inhibited the development of an employee's right to challenge his employer's unfair and damaging
practices. An employer has traditionally enjoyed an absolute right to discharge an employee for any or no reason in the absence of an agreement to
retain him for a specified period of time. 24 This concept of "terinability at
will" permits an employer to fire any employee who objects to the employer's
collection and use of information about him.:' As a result, an employer may
22.

See note 262 infra and accompanying text.

23. See notes 78-86 infra and accompanying text.
24. 9 S. Williston, Contracts § 1017 (W. Jaeger ed. 1967); see, e.g., Pearson v. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439, 441 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914 (1964); Shaw v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 328 N.E.2d 775, 779 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); Simmons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
311 So. 2d 28, 31 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 175, 319
A.2d 174, 176 (1974). Terminability at will is based upon the concept of mutuality of obligation in

the law of contracts. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Law of Contracts § 4-14 (2d ed. 1977). Because the
employee is free to leave his job at any time, the principle of mutuality provides an employer with
a similar right to terminate their relationship. Simmons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 311 So. 2d
at 31 (citing Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, Inc., 174 La. 66, 67, 139 So. 760, 761 (1932)).
Recent commentary has criticized the terminability at will theory as an anachronistic vestige of
nineteenth century notions of freedom of contract between parties of relatively equal bargaining
power. See, e.g., Blades, supra note 1, at 1418; Summers, supra note 3, at 485-88; Comment,
Towards a Property Right in Employment, 22 Buffalo L. Rev. 1081, 1082-84 (1973); Note,
Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 335, 337-40 (1974). Courts have also
expressed dissatisfaction over the terminability theory. In Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H.
130, 134, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974), the court found that a bad faith termination of an "at will"
employee was a breach of the employment contract. As noted by the dissent, this decision
constituted "broad new unprecedented law". Id. at 137, 316 A.2d at 553 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
For further criticism in a case that narrowly upheld terminability at will, see Geary v. United
States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 190-94, 319 A.2d 174, 183-85 (1974) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
25. "This traditional rule ... is what most tends to make [an employee] a docile follower of
his employer's every wish." Blades, supra note 1, at 1405.
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generally collect and use this information in virtually any way it chooses.7 6
The employee's options are either to accept the practices, to protest them and

face possible dismissal, or to leave his job voluntarily, none of which are
particularly desirable. The employee will also find himself without any legal

remedies because existing actions for privacy invasion have limited applicabil-

ity in the employment context. 27 The employer, on the other hand, will

probably have little difficulty in replacing the employee and may continue its
practices without legal restriction.

11.

EXISTING PRIVACY RIGHTS

A. The ConstitutionalRight of Privacy
Although the Constitution contains no specific provision which affords

individuals privacy rights, several amendments have been identified as
sources of such rights. 28 The constitutional right of privacy can be classified

as protecting three general interests: 29 the interest in freedom from unreasonable governmental searches and surveillance; 30 the interest in controlling the
dissemination of personal information; 3 1 and the interest in autonomy in

making intimate personal decisions. 32 Unfortunately, these constitutional
protections have no direct application to the private sector employment

context because the requisite state action to trigger constitutional analysis is

lacking. 33 Although arguments have been advanced to extend the state action
concept to the private sector employer so as to bring these constitutional

26. See Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 436 F. Supp. 1328, 1330, 1333-34 (W.D. Pa.
1977) (discharge of "at will" employees discovered to be living together in "open adultery" held
not to violate their constitutional right to privacy).
27. See pt. II(A), (B) infra.
28. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (fourteenth amendment's concept of personal
liberty); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (fourth amendment); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (penumbra of the Bill of Rights); id. at 487 (Goldberg,
J., concurring) (ninth amendment); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (first
amendment).
29. Crain v. Krehbiel, 443 F. Supp. 202, 207-08 (N.D. Cal. 1977); see Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 599-600 & nn.24 & 25 (1977).
30. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (eavesdropping on conversations made from enclosed telephone booth held to violate fourth amendment); Rochin v
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952) (pumping of defendant's stomach held an unlawful forced
confession).
31. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977); cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
462-66 (1958) (state requirement that private organization reveal its membership list held to
violate freedom of association). In United States v. Mfiller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), the Court did not
extend the right to control disclosure to permit a bank depositor to prevent his bank from
complying with a subpoena. Id. at 440-41. Although the reach of the Miller decision is unclear,
the Court distinguished the facts of the case from other situations in which an interest in
controlling disclosure should be afforded constitutional protection. Id. at 444-45 nn.6 & 7.
32. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 15 -56 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 481-86 (1965).
33. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects only against infringements
of rights by the state and not against those by private parties. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974).
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protections into play, 34 there is no reason to believe that the vast majority of
private sector employers will be directly subject to constitutional limitations in
35
the foreseeable future.
B.

The Common Law Right of Privacy

An influential law review article by Warren and Brandeis in 1890,36
37
lamenting the indiscreet reporting of "high society" by gossip columnists,
first proposed the development of a common law right of privacy. The article
reinterpreted prior common law actions for wrongful publication of private
letters and intellectual property as arising not from the breach of an implied
contract or from a narrow interpretation of property law, but from an
independent interest in the right to an inviolate personality-the right to
privacy. 38 New York was the first state to adopt a limited privacy right by
34. One established line of analysis would find the activities of large corporations to be state
action because of their pervasive influence over the lives of many citizens. See, e.g.,
Berle,
ConstitutionalLimitations on CorporateActivity-Protection of PersonalRights from Invasion
Through Economic Power, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 933 (1952). Although the Court has never accepted
this argument, it has, on occasion, found state action when a private corporation was performing
governmental functions. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (private corporation
performing all necessary municipal functions in company-owned town). Some commentators have
endorsed this "private state action" approach as a method of applying constitutional privacy law
to the private sector. See, e.g., Hermann, Privacy, the Prospective Employee, and Employment
Testing: The Need To Restrict Polygraph and PersonalityTesting, 47 Wash. L. Rev. 74, 140-42,
148-49 (1971); Comment, Privacy: The Polygraph in Employment, 30 Ark. L. Rev. 35, 44-45
(1976).
35. Although state action was found in Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975), the case would seem to be sui generis. In Holodnak, the employer
was a government contractor, and the United States owned all of the land, buildings, and
equipment used by the employer, and supervised the manufacturing process. Id. at 289. In Flagg
Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), however, the Court refused to expand the state
action doctrine to a private sale of goods by a warehouseman acting under the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Given the extreme facts of Holodnak, and the Court's failure to
expand the state action doctrine in Flagg Brothers, the state action requirement still cannot be
interpreted on the basis of any judicial authority to include the privacy-invading activities of any
large private employer. In Flagg Brothers, the Court noted that under the public function analysis
of state action, a private organization must be performing functions that have been exclusively
reserved to government. Id. at 157-64. Using a second line of state action analysis, the Court
reaffirmed the view expressed in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974),
that the mere acquiescence of the state in private action is not tantamount to state action. 436
U.S. at 164-66. Requiring a private party to conform to certain standards, however, would
constitute state action. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). Thus, absent judicial
or legislative enactment that expressly requires a party to perform some act, it is unlikely that
state action will be found. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. at 168-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Since the direction of these decisions is to require a case-by-case determination of whether state
action exists, based upon criteria that are unlikely to be met by most private employers, it is
unrealistic to formulate a theory of constitutional privacy protection that would be generally
applicable to the private sector.
36. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
37. Id. at 196.
38. Id. at 211-13.
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statute, 39 and virtually every state has subsequently recognized, either judicially or by statute, a privacy right in one form or another.40
The broad contours of this common law right, reflected in the academic
debate over the precise characterization of privacy interests, 4 1 preclude any
exact definition of its nature and scope. There is, however, a general
consensus that the common law right is divided into four distinct causes of
action: (1) public disclosure of private facts; (2) placement of an individual in
a false light before the public eye; (3) commercial appropriation of an
individual's name or likeness; and (4) intrusion upon an individual's seclusion.42

These causes of action have provided minimal practical benefit to the
employee aggrieved by his employer's unfair collection and disclosure procedures. 43 The action for commercial appropriation is narrow and fails to
address the major privacy issues facing employees. 4 4 At first glance, the
39. 1903 N.Y. Laws ch. 132, §§ 1-2 (current version at N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50-51
(McKinney 1976)). Section 51 provides an action for damages and injunctive relief for the
unconsented use of any person's name, portrait, or picture for advertising purposes without his
consent. This is essentially a codification of the common law action for commercial appropriation.
See notes 42, 44 infra and accompanying text.
40. Only Nebraska and Wisconsin have expressly rejected a privacy right. See Brunson v.
Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955); Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75
N.W.2d 925 (1956). In addition to New York, five states recognize a limited privacy right
pursuant to statute. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 214, § 3A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974); Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 21, §§ 839.1-.3 (West Supp. 1977); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28 (Supp. 1977); Utah Code Ann. §§
76-9-401 to -406 (Supp. 1977); Va. Code § 18.2-216.1 (Supp. 1978). The remainder of the states
have judicially adopted the broader common law right of privacy. See, e.g., Rugg v. McCarty,
173 Colo. 170, 476 P.2d 753 (1970); Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956);
Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973).
41. Privacy protection has been described as serving a variety of functions, including

"personal autonomy," "emotional release," "self-evaluation," and "limiting and protecting communication." A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom 32-39 (1967). The importance of allowing an
individual to conceal the intimate facts of certain private relationships, such as marriage, has also
been noted. Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L.J. 475, 484 (1968). Another commentator has focused on
the right to control the disclosure of information about oneself. Beaney, The Right to Privacy and
American Law, 31 Law & Contemp. Prob. 253, 254 (1966).
42. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 117, at 804-14(4th ed. 1971). The separate nature of the
four actions has been challenged. See Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An

Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962 (1964). Professor Bloustein attempts to unify the
four torts under the concept of dignity. In all the privacy cases, "[tihe injury is to our

individuality, to our dignity as individuals, and the legal remedy represents a social vindication of
the human spirit thus threatened rather than a recompense for the loss suffered." Id. at 1003.
Dean Prosser, however, has advocated the separateness of the four torts by pointing out the
distinct interests that they represent. For example, the intrusion tort is akin to the tort of the
intentional infliction of mental distress, whereas the tort of public disclosure of private facts
protects a reputational interest. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 422 (1960).
43. In some cases, an employee might be able to bring a defamation action as a result of an
employer's disseminations. Employers, however, have traditionally enjoyed a qualified privilege
against libel and slander suits based on their remarks in employee letters of reference. Comment,
Qualified Privilege to Defame Employees and Credit Applicants, 12 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
143, 144 (1977).

44. Although it is certainly possible that an employee's name or likeness might be commer-
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actions for public disclosure and false light would seem to afford some

protection against an employer's communication of embarrassing or mislead45
ing information in references to outsiders or in intracompany reports.

Several barriers, however, prevent such an application of the privacy right.
First of all, these actions require that publication of the privacy-invading facts

be made to a large group of people. 46 A disclosure to one or two employees or
47
to a subsequent employer would not ordinarily satisfy this requirement.
Furthermore, these disclosures would have to be made without the employee's
consent to give rise to the cause of action. 48 This requirement often precludes
recovery because, even if the employee did not expressly consent to subsequent disclosures of information, he may be deemed to have consented
implicitly by voluntarily supplying information to an employer, or by failing

to object to the collection of information from third parties.4 9 Also, any
information developed independently by an employer, such as a performance
evaluation, would not be regarded as private and thus its disclosure would
not be tortious.- °

cially appropriated by an employer, it is not any more likely to occur to an employee than to
anyone else. To the extent that such an injury does occur, the existing cause of action is adequate.
45. The elements of the public disclosure cause of action are: (1) publicity; (2) disclosure of
facts that are private, rather than public; and (3) the facts so publicized would be objectionable to
a reasonable man. W. Prosser, supra note 42, § 117, at 809-12. An action for false light requires:
(1) publicity; (2) a false portrayal; and (3) a portrayal objectionable to a reasonable man. It might
consist of falsely attributing statements to a person or juxtaposing one's picture with an article
when there is, in fact, no connection. Id. § 117, at 812-13.
46. Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9, 11 (5th Cir. 1962); W. Prosser,
supra note 42, § 117, at 810, 814. This publication requirement reflects the fact that privacy
actions evolved largely from concerns with the publicity given by the mass media. See A. Westin
& M. Baker, supra note 21, at 19.
47. See W. Prosser, supra note 42, § 117, at 810. But see Beaumont v. Brown, 401 Mich. 80,
257 N.W.2d 522 (1977). In Beaumont, the Michigan Supreme Court permitted an action for the
public disclosure of private facts based on an employer's dissemination of information to the
plaintiffs Army reserve officer. The employer had written a letter to the reserve officer stating
that the employee had manipulated his reserve duty and submitted false health reports. The court
found sufficient publication because the information was not contained in a personal letter and
thus would be made known throughout the Army reserve office. Id. at 102, 257 N.W.2d at 530,
The court also stated that the facts in the letter about the plaintiff's health were "not necessary"
and that the information about military status could have been conveyed without "pejorative
overtones." Id. at 97-98, 257 N.W.2d at 528. For the present, Beaumont represents a departure
from the traditional analysis of the public disclosure of private facts. The court's reliance on the
fact that the employer was under no duty to provide the health information and did not have to
convey the information in such a negative tone is a novel approach. Id. at 97-98, 257 N.W.2d at
528. The same can be said for the analysis of the publication requirement.
48. See generally W. Prosser, supra note 42, § 18, at 101-03.
49. See Bloomfield v. Retail Credit Co., 14 Ill. App. 3d 158, 173-74, 302 N.E.2d 88, 100
(1973) (implied consent to disclosure of credit report to employers because plaintiff had supplied
their names as credit references); In re Bates, 555 S.W.2d 420, 430 (Tex. 1977) (conversation with
an individual is implied consent to disclosure of the contents of the discussion to third parties).
50. "Information about the plaintiff which was already known to others could hardly be
regarded as private to the plaintiff." Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 569, 255
N.E.2d 765, 770, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647, 654 (1970).
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The fourth privacy action, intrusion upon an individual's seclusion, is not
concerned with the content or disclosure of the information, but rather with
the injury inflicted by the method used to obtain it.51 Wiretapping, physical
intrusions into a person's residence, and other frequently overzealous means
of surveillance are examples of intrusive activities that have formed the basis
for liability under this cause of action. 5 2 In the employment relationship,
employers use similarly intrusive activities such as lie detectors, overbroad
and irrelevant application forms, closed circuit television surveillance, and
pretext interviews in which an investigator conceals his identity and purpose
in order to obtain information about an employee from others." 3
Nevertheless, an intrusion action brought by an employee stands little
chance of success. Express consent, which will bar any claim asserted by the
employee, is usually obtained prior to the use of many of these methods of
collecting information.5 4 Recovery is difficult even when methods are used in
which consent is not normally obtained. The collection of information from
third parties is not considered an intrusion upon anything private because the
facts are already known to the third parties."5 In addition, one court has held
that the use of closed circuit surveillance devices, ostensibly for the purpose of
evaluating employee efficiency, has a sufficient business justification to rebut
56
any claim of unconsented-to intrusion.
The causes of action comprising the common law right of privacy, though
affording valuable privacy protection to society as a whole, have almost no
application to the employment relationship. In most cases, application of the
technical legal definitions of consent, publicity, or private facts would bar an
51. See Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969).
Intrusion is the only privacy tort that does not involve "informational betrayal." Note, The
Massachusetts Right of Privacy Statute: Decoy or Ugly Duckling?, 9 Suffolk L. Rev. 1248, 1276
(1975).
52. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) ('constant surveillance"
and "obstrusive and intruding presence"); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 246 (9th Cir.
1971) (surreptitious photographing and recording in private home); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106
N.H. 107, 108, 206 A.2d 239, 240 (1964) (electronic listening and recording device installed in
plaintiffs' bedroom); Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 570, 255 N.E.2d 765, 771,
307 N.Y.S.2d 647, 655 (1970) ("overzealous" surveillance which included following the plaintiff
into a bank and observing the amount of money withdrawn from his bank account).
53. Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 240, 330-35.
54. Consent "negative[s] the existence of any [intentional] tort." W. Prosser, supra note 42, §
18, at 101; see Comment, The Polygraph in Private Industry: Regulation or Elimination?, 15
Buffalo L. Rev. 655, 667 (1966) (discussing express consent to polygraph). Although the consent
in these circumstances is perhaps illusory, as a result of the economic necessity for the employee
to submit to these practices or risk being fired, it does not rise to the level of duress traditionally
required for negating the consent. The threat of losing employment, a form of economic coercion,
is specifically cited by Dean Prosser as an example of an insufficient level of coercion for a finding
of consent under duress. W. Prosser, supra note 42, § 18, at 106. The threat ordinarily must be of
direct physical harm. Id.
55. See Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 568-69, 255 N.E.2d 765, 770, 307
N.Y.S.2d 647, 654 (1970) (interviewing acquaintances of the plaintiff does not constitute an
actionable invasion of privacy).
56. Thomas v. General Electric Co., 207 F. Supp. 792, 799 tW.D. Ky 1962).
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employee's claim. Nevertheless, the conclusion remains inescapable that the
practices that employees
are subjected to invade interests in what is best
7
identified as privacy.5

C. The FairCredit Reporting Act
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), enacted by Congress in 1970,58
remains the most important federal legislative effort to regulate privacyinvading activities in the private sector. 9 The FCRA was primarily designed
to curtail the abuses by credit agencies in the reporting of personal information about individuals. 60 The almost indiscriminate disclosure of personal
facts, concerning such matters as an individual's financial status, medical
history, and sexual relationships, to virtually anyone that requested the
information 6 often resulted in substantial embarrassment and humiliation to
57. See notes 14-23 supra and accompanying text.
58. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 601, 84 Stat. 1127 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1976)).
59. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (Buckley Amendment), 20
U.S.C. § 1232g (1976), is the other important federal privacy statute applicable to the private
sector. It provides parents of school children with access to their child's school records, id. §
1232g(a)(1)(A), and requires that their written consent be obtained prior to the disclosure of
information by the school to third parties. Id. § 1232g(b)(l). Although both of these rights are
broader than comparable FCRA provisions, see notes 68, 74-76 infra and accompanying text, the
FCRA is used to illustrate federal privacy legislation because it imposes a greater variety of
requirements on credit agencies. The FCRA, for example, expressly provides a private cause of
action for damages, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n-1681o (1976), whereas the Buckley Amendment does not.
See Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267, 1276-77 (8th Cir. 1977). Furthermore, the lack
of legislative hearings on the Buckley Amendment and sparsity of case law makes analysis of Its
provisions problematic. See Rios v. Read, 73 F.R.D. 589, 597 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
60. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). See generally ProtectingPrivacy, supra note 17, at 553-56;
Note, Protecting the Subjects of Credit Reports, 80 Yale L.J. 1035, 1037-40 (1971) fhereinafter
cited as Protecting Subjects].
There are actually two types of credit agencies. One, commonly known as the "credit bureau,"
specializes in the preparation of reports for credit purposes, primarily for merchants considering
the extension of retail credit. These reports emphasize financial information, such as credit
history, existing lines of credit, bank balances, and bill-paying habits, and frequently include
information about the subject's employment history and marital life. Comment, Commercial
Credit Bureaus: The Right to Privacy and State Action, 24 Am. U. L. Rev. 421, 423-24 (1975).
The second type of credit agency, which has been termed the "credit reporting bureau," see
Protecting Privacy, supra note 17, at 552, supplies more detailed reports than those supplied by
credit bureaus. In addition to the information presented in a credit bureau's report, credit
reporting bureaus also include comments on the character, reputation, and personal habits of the
subject based upon interviews with friends, neighbors, and co-workers. Employers and insurance
companies are leading users of such reports. See A. We,,tin & M. Baker, supra note 21, at 131.
The FCRA eliminates this terminology by defining all organizations subject to its requirements
as "consumer reporting agencies," 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(1) (1976), but recognizes the distinction
between the two types of reports by separately defining "consumer reports" (similar to credit
bureau reports), id. § 1681a(d), and "investigative consumer reports" (similar to credit reporting
bureau reports). Id. § 1681a(e). Although the provisions covering consumer reports are applicable
to investigative consumer reports, see Ley v. Boron Oil Co., 419 F. Supp. 1240, 1242 (W.D. Pa.
1976), some additional requirements for investigative con!;umer reports are provided. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. § 1681d (1976).
61. The relative ease with which persons having no legitimate need for information could
gain access to credit reports about other individuals was illustrated by an experiment conducted
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the subject of the report. 62 The reporting of inaccurate, incomplete, or
obsolete information was frequently a direct cause of the denial of credit,
employment, or insurance 63 to an individual who was generally unaware that
such information was being reported. 64 Even if he did become aware, he had
no legal right65to require correction of the reports or to remedy the harm that
was caused.

The FCRA is relevant to the present inquiry for two reasons. First, because
credit agencies frequently distribute their reports to employers which use them
in making employment decisions, 66 the FCRA's regulation of credit agencies
and users of credit reports grants private sector employees their only federally
legislated privacy rights. Second, the FCRA's scheme of rights and remedies
presents a possible model for similar regulation of employers in the private
sector.
1.

Employee Protection

The privacy rights afforded the employee under the FCRA are certainly
tangible, albeit of limited scope. If an employer requests a credit report on a
prospective employee and, as a result of information contained in that report,
decides not to make a job offer, the employer must inform the rejected
applicant of the name and address of the credit agency that supplied the
report. 67 The applicant may then make a request of the credit agency to learn
68
the "nature and substance" of most of the information maintained on him.
The credit agency must also disclose the sources of the information 69 and all
in 1970 which focused national attention on the credit reporting problem. CBS News invented a
company and supplied it with letterheads, a mailing address, and telephone service. The fictitious
company wrote to twenty-eight credit bureaus requesting reports on persons who had complained
to their congressmen about credit bureaus. Of twenty-three responses, seven complete reports and
three contractual offers to supply reports were received. Even though this occurred prior to the
enactment of the FCRA, the credit bureaus were violating industry-wide regulations promulgated
by the Associated Credit Bureaus of America that were in force at the time. Protecting Subjects.
supra note 60, at 1039-40 & n.24.
62.

See Protecting Privacy, supra note 17, at 554.

63. See id. at 555-56 (such decisions characterized as "irrational discriminations").
64.

Protecting Subjects, supra note 60, at 1037.

65. Of course, an action for libel or slander might be available. Id. at 1049-54. Recovery
against credit agencies is difficult, however, because they are protected by a qualified privilege
which requires the plaintiff to show that the credit agency acted with malice. See, e.g.,
Bloomfield v. Retail Credit Co., 14 Ill.
App. 3d 158, 302 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Thornton v. New S.
Life Ins. Co., 262 S.C. 651, 207 S.E.2d 88 (1974).
66. Protecting Privacy, supra note 17, at 553.

67. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (1976). If an employer does make a job offer, there is no such
requirement. Therefore, unless a successful applicant has independent knowledge of his rights
under the FCRA and the name of the credit agency maintaining his file, his right of access will be
vindicated only after an adverse decision has been made. See Hayden, How Much Does the Boss
Need to Know?, 3 Civ. Lib. Rev. 23, 26 (Aug.-Sept. 1976).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1) (1976). "The intent [is] to permit the consumer to examine all the
information in his file except for sources of investigative information, while not giving the
consumer the right to physically handle his file." H.R. Rep. No. 1587, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 29,
reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4414, 4415.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(2) (1976). Sources for the more detailed investigative consumer
report need not be disclosed. Id.
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recipients of reports within the preceding six months. 70 If the subject disputes
the accuracy of any item in his file, he is entitled to have that item
reinvestigated by the credit agency. 71 In the event that the reinvestigation
does not resolve the dispute, the subject may have his version of the disputed
facts included in subsequent reports. 72 If the reinvestigation results in the
deletion of information from a report or causes the subject to dispute the
results of the reinvestigation, the credit agency must, at the subject's request,
73
notify prior recipients designated by the subject.

The FCRA also provides that a credit agency's report may not include
obsolete matters, defined by the Act to include certain specific types of
information74 as well as any adverse information that is more than seven
years old when the report is made. 75 Also, if an employer requests a more
in-depth report that will require neighbors, friends, or associates of the
subject to be interviewed by the credit agency, 7the
subject must first be
6
notified that the investigation will be conducted.
Although these rights under the FCRA enable an employee to have greater
knowledge of the information being collected and disseminated about him,
two recent cases illustrate the limited remedial value of the FCRA in the
employment area. 77 In Goodnough v. Alexander's, Inc., 78 a seventeen-yearold department store clerk was discharged after her employer learned from a
credit report that she had been accused of shoplifting at the age of twelve.
Because the information was less than seven years old and therefore not

obsolete under the FCRA's standards, the credit agency had an absolute right
to report it. 7 9 The clerk was also held to have no remedy against her employer
70. Id. § 1681g(a)(3).
71. Id. § 1681i(a).
72. Id. § 1681i(b)-(c). The credit agency is not required, however, to inform a subject of his
right to file such a statement of dispute. Roseman v. Retail Credit Co., 428 F. Supp. 643 (E.D.
Pa. 1977); Middlebrooks v. Retail Credit Co., 416 F Supp. 1013, 1018 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(d) (1976). In these situations, a subject must be notified of his right to
make such a request. Id.
74. Id. § 1681c. The information that cannot be reported includes bankruptcies more than
fourteen years old at the time of the report, and suits or judgments, delinquent accounts, paid tax
liens, and information about arrests, indictments, or convictions that occurred more than seven
years prior to the report. Id. §§ 1681c(a)(1)-(5).
75. Id. § 1681c(a)(6). None of the provisions in § 1681c(a) apply if the subject of the report Is
applying for a job at an annual salary of $20,000 or more. Id. § 1681c(b)(3).
76. Id. § 1681d(a)(1). Such a notification need not be given when the report is being prepared
to evaluate the subject for a job for which he has not specifically applied. Id. § 168ld(a)(2).
77. The Act has limited value in other contexts as well. Cf. Sizemore v. Bambi Leasing Corp.,
360 F. Supp. 252, 255 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (FCRA does not protect consumers applying for business
credit); Porter v. Talbot Perkins Children's Servs., 355 F. Supp. 174, 178-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(child adoption agency is not a consumer reporting agency within the FCRA because Its decisions
are not economic ones).
78. 82 Misc. 2d 662, 370 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
79. Id. at 664-65, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 390-91. The court felt constrained to reach this decision by
the specific provisions of the FCRA, but criticized the statute nonetheless. "The [FCRAI needs
strengthening to make unduly prejudicial, questionable, or insignificant information of youthful
discrimination unavailable. But, right now, there is no law against a reporting agency passing on
such information, nor against a department store's moral abdication in using it. There Is not even
a statutory standard." Id. In other words, there is no relevancy standard. See Herring v. Retail
Credit Co., 266 S.C. 455, 459-60, 224 S.E.2d 663, 665 (1976). The absence of such a standard has
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because she was employed "at will.1180
In Peller v. Retail Credit Co., 8 1 the plaintiff had applied for a job with a
company that required all applicants to undergo lie detector tests. He was not
hired because the test revealed that he had previously smoked marijuana.
After being hired by another company, the plaintiff was dismissed when his
new employer requested a copy of his credit report and discovered his prior
marijuana use. The plaintiffs suit against the first employer and the administrator of the lie detector test, alleging violations of the FCRA and invasion of
privacy, was dismissed. 8 2 The court held that neither of the defendants were
subject to the FCRA's requirements because they were not consumer reporting agencies. 8 3 Furthermore, because the FCRA forbids invasion of privacy
suits based on information that is obtained pursuant to its procedures unless
there is a showing of malice,8 4 the plaintiffs claims did not fall within the
provisions of the Act. 85 The minimal requirements imposed on the users of
credit reports8 6 precluded any action against the second employer who had
requested the report and dismissed the plaintiff.
In both cases, the individuals faced repeated injury by the continued
reporting of information of questionable relevance. The prospect of an
individual being unable to find employment for a seven year period because of
arguably irrelevant information that subsequently finds its way into credit
reports seems to be an unduly harsh punishment. The fact that the information is frequently obtained by methods that may themselves constitute invasions of privacy makes the widespread dissemination of that information a
frightening possibility. These gaps in the FCRA's application to the employment context indicate the need for stronger limitations on the methods of
collection used and the types of information collected,8887 and on the present
ease with which such information may be obtained.
2.

The FCRA as a Model for Regulation of Employers

The most important provisions of the FCRA permit access by a subject to
credit information, correction procedures, and damages when the subject
suffers injury. 89 Such provisions have emerged as fundamental elements of
informational privacy legislation. 9" Beyond these skeletal concepts, however,
been described as the fundamental weakness of the Act. ProtectingPrivacy supra note 17, at 560;
see Hayden, supra note 67, at 26.
80. 82 Misc. 2d at 665, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 391; see note 24 supra and accompanying text.
81. 359 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D. Ga. 1973), aff'd mem., 505 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1974).
82. Id. at 1237.
83. Id.; see note 60 supra.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (1976).
85. 359 F. Supp. at 1237.
86. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
87. See pt. IV(BX1) infra.
88. See pt. IV(B)(4) infra.
89. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n-1681o (1976) (actions for damages based on intentional or negligent
violations).
90. See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(d)(1)-(2), (g)(4) (1976); Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g(a)(1)(A), (a)(2) (1976). For a discussion of the
Privacy Act of 1974, see pt. 1I(D) infra. See also Bagley, The Politics of Privacy, in Privacy (A
Summary of a Seminar on Privacy) 55 (Council of State Governments ed. 1975).
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the specific scheme of rights and remedies established by the FCRA is not
susceptible to ready incorporation into other private sector privacy legislation.
The FCRA is aimed at the particular problems of the credit reporting
industry, 9 1 focusing on the actual processes of reporting credit information,
the users of that information, and the damage that is likely to result from a
misuse of the procedures. Regulation of credit agencies was relatively easy
because certain specific practices of the credit agencies could be identified and
made the subject of regulation. Private sector employers, however, are more
varied in their collection practices and uses of personal information. 92 Employers collect many types of information, such as psychological, medical,
intelligence, credit, and employment evaluations. The precise uses of this
information may be difficult to identify as the critical factor in any one of the
many decisions made affecting an employee. Because of the relative diversity
and sheer number of employer practices, legislation must not only identify
and limit specific abuses, but must also formulate broader objective standards
93
that would apply fairly to all employers.
The FCRA therefore fails to provide an adequate model for employee
privacy legislation. In addition, the specific weaknesses of the statute, such as
its lack of any general standard of relevance to evaluate what type of
information may be reported, 94 its failure to require that a subject always be
informed of his rights, 95 its limited access provision, 96 and its limitation on
liability from actions for invasion of privacy, 97 all suggest that some refinement is needed before it will fully protect the privacy interests of consumers in
general, much less serve as a model for other legislation.
D. The Privacy Act of 1974
The Privacy Act of 197498 establishes a complete framework of rights
and remedies for the subjects of records that are maintained by federal agen91.

Indeed, industry representatives were closely involved in the drafting of the legislation.

See generally Denney, Federal FairCredit Reporting Act, 88 Banking L.J. 579, 583-84 (1971).

The statute has nevertheless been the subject of many specific criticisms. See, e.g., Privacy
Report, supra note 8, at 70; Protecting Privacy, sura note 17, at 558-61.

92.

The diversity of employer practices has frequently been noted. See, e.g., Privacy: Joint

Hearings on S.3418, S.3633, S.3116, S.2810, and S.2542 Before the Ad Hoc Subcomnn. oi
Privacy and Information Systems of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations and the
Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.

629-31 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Privacy Hearings] (statement of National Retail Merchants
Association); Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 233. The Privacy Commission, however, suggests
implementing some of its recommendations on employee privacy by amending the FCRA. See
notes 148-50 infra and accompanying text.
93. An example of a specific provision would be to prohibit the use of lie detectors, see notes
255-72 infra and accompanying text, rather than attempting to prohibit all intrusive collection
devices. The latter provision would undoubtedly create serious uncertainty because of the great
number and variety of collection methods utilized by employers. A general provision that
accommodates various employer practices, yet establishes a clear standard, would be to require
an employee's consent to an employer's dissemination of information about him. See note 274
infra and accompanying text.
94. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
95. See notes 67, 72, 76 supra.
96. See note 68 supra.
97. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
98. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
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cies. 99 The fundamental purpose of the Act is to require agencies to keep their
records with due regard for the privacy interests of the subjects of those
records, and to give the subjects some control over the process of collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination of information about them. Although
the Act has no direct application to the private sector,100 its comprehensive
provisions are the clearest expression of federal policy in the area of informational privacy.' 0 1

The Act incorporates the basic elements of recordkeeping privacy protection that have evolved to date. Subject to various exceptions,

102

it provides

99. Before its enactment, the right of privacy was usually "subordinated to the more concrete
objectives to be gained through particular requests for information." Eastman, Enforcing the
Right of Privacy Through the Privacy Act of 1974, 34 Fed. B.J. 335, 335 (1975). Preliminary

research conducted prior to the Privacy Act revealed 858 federal data banks containing more than
1.25 billion records on individuals. Privacy Hearings, supra note 92, at 4. A more complete
survey, conducted in 1975, revealed 3.8 billion records. Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 529
n.35.
Prior to the enactment of the Privacy Act, there were several important studies and congressional hearings on the subject of the federal government's information, collection, and
recordkeeping practices, and, more specifically, the effect of those practices on public employees.
The most important study enunciated five principles of fair information practices, emphasizing
the need for data subjects to be aware of, and have some control over, information systems.
See Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, U.S. Dep't of
Health, Education and Welfare, Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens 41 (1973). For
earlier congressional hearings, see, e.g., Right to Privacy of Federal Employees: Hearing on H.R.
1281 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Retirement and Employee Benefits of the House
Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1973-1974); Federal Data
Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).

100. A provision that would have made the Privacy Act applicable to private sector
organizations was present in the original Senate version of the Act, S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §
201(a), reprinted in Privacy Hearings, supra note 92, at 357. S. Rep. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
50, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6932, 6932. The provision was deleted,
however, because of the prevailing view that analysis and empirical study on this question had
not been performed. See Privacy Hearings, supra note 99, at 31-32 (discussion among Rep. Koch,
Rep. Goldwater, and Sen. Jackson), 40-41 (statement of Elliot L. Richardson), 72 (statement of

Alan Westin). A subsequent legislative attempt to extend the requirements of the Privacy Act to
the private sector was rejected. See H.R. 1984, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 Cong. Rec. 1216
(1975); Note, Let Industry Beware: A Survey of Privacy Legislation and its Potential Impact on

Business, 11 Tulsa L.J. 68, 76-81 (1975). The Privacy Commission also rejected the direct
application of the Privacy Act to the private sector. Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 497-98. The
Privacy Act is, however, applicable to government contractors. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(m) (1976). See
generally Bedell, Government Contractors, and the Initial Steps of the Privacy Act, 34 Fed. B.J.

330, 330-33 (1975).
101. See Eastman, supra note 99, at 335. The Privacy Act has had a substantial influence on
subsequent state privacy legislation covering government agencies. Compare 5 U.S.C. §

552a(e)(3)(B)-(D) (1976) witht Ark. Stat. Ann. § 16-806(a)-(c) (Supp. 1975) and Minn. Stat. Ann. §
15.165(2)(a)-c) (West Supp. 1978).

102. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(b)(1)-(11) (1976) (disclosures permitted without consent for a
"routine use," to Congress, or for statistical purpose), () (general exemptions from the Act's
requirement for the Central Intelligence Agency and law enforcement agendes), (k) (exemptions
from specific provisions, such as access, for investigatory law enforcement information and

employment recommendations supplied by a third party who received an express promise of
confidentiality). Even when a reasonable claim for information is made, the policy against
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that: (1) agencies may maintain only "relevant and necessary" information in
their records; 0 3 (2) agencies should endeavor to collect information directly
from the subjects of the records rather than from third parties; 10 4 (3) when
individuals are requested to supply information, they must be informed of the
purpose of collection and the uses to which the information will be put; 10 5 (4)
individuals must be afforded an opportunity to examine their files upon
request; 1 0 6 (5) individuals may request amendment of a record, 10 7 and, if the
agency disagrees with an amendment request, may file a statement of disagreement which must be noted in subsequent disclosures, and the amendment or statement of disagreement must be sent to prior recipients of the
record;' 08 (6) records about an individual should not be disclosed to third
parties without his written consent' 0 9 unless the disclosure is for a "routine
use";110 (7) a record of all disclosures made about an individual must be made
disclosure requires anyone seeking information to identify an appropriate exemption. In Local
2047, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Defense Gen. Supply Center, 423 F. Supp. 481 (E.D.
Va. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 573 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1978), the plaintiff, a labor organization
representing federal government employees, sought to obtain certain information about its
members pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The government asserted
the Privacy Act as a defense. The court accepted this defense, noting that the information sought
did not fail within the routine use exemption that allows disclosure, id. at 484, and that the
purposes of the Privacy Act overrode the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 485. The court
suggested that the union obtain such information directly from its members. Id. at 486 n.4.
Although the effect of this case was to inconvenience t.e union, it illustrates that the exemptions
to the Privacy Act will not be loosely construed. Accord, Mervin v. Bonfanti, 410 F. Supp. 1205
(D.D.C. 1976) (in camera examination of certain performance evaluations ordered to determine if
material was, in fact, confidential and thus exempt from disclosure requirements).
103. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (1976). This requirement is intended to force agencies to evaluate
their need for particular types of information. An agency must first establish that the collection of
an item of information is relevant to its statutory purpose. Then, it must be determined that the
information is necessary because the agency's needs "cannot reasonably be met through alternative means." S. Rep. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 46, reprinted in (1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 6916, 6961; see Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 513. For a discussion of the application of
the relevant and necessary standard to private employees, see pt. IV(B)(1)(b) infra.
104. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(2) (1976).
105. Id. § 552a(e)(3). This provision applies to an individual supplying information about
himself or a third party.
106. Id. § 552a(d)(1).
107. Id. § 552a(d)(2).
108. Id. § 552a(d)(3)-(4).
109. Id. § 552a(b); see Local 2047, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Defense Gen. Supply
curiam, 573 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1978).
Center, 423 F. Supp. 481, 483 (E.D. Va. 1976), qfd p.,r
110. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (1976). A "routine use" is defined as the use of a record "for a
purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected." Id. § 552a(a)(7).
Authority to promulgate such "routine uses" is delegated- to the agencies, and each agency must
develop a list of the categories of users and the purpose of each use. Id. § 552a(e)(4)(D). A routine
use would be disclosures by the Internal Revenue Service to parties with whom it is engaged In
litigation, Harper v. United States, 423 F. Supp. 192, 198 (D.S.C. 1976), or, in some circumstances, the disclosure of the names of employees to labor unions, Local 2047, Am. Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. Defense Gen. Supply Center, 423 F. Supp. 481, 484 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd per
curiam, 573 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1978). Such routine uses will, however, be narrowly construed.
See id. at 486.
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available to him upon request; 111 and (8) individuals may sue for damages
and injunctive relief for violations of the above provisions. 112
The Privacy Acts provisions for access, correction, and damages are
similar to the provisions of the FCRA. "13 The other provisions of the Privacy
Act, however, are broader and more encompassing. These requirements, in
contrast to the specific focus of the FCRA, are phrased in general terms
because they are designed to apply to a variety of agencies that have different
needs and procedures. The exemptions to the Act provide for special treat4
ment of particular agencies that may require it."1
The Privacy Act should not, of course, be made directly applicable to
private employers because many of its provisions are concerned with the
particular practices of federal agencies. For several reasons, however, the
Privacy Act is an appropriate model for regulation of the private sector
employer. Its general purpose is to elucidate principles of informational
privacy that can be implemented by different agencies that do not necessarily
share common information-gathering practices."' s The Act further complements its general requirements with particularized exemptions. This approach
allows the statute to have wide application, while isolating those situations in
which the requirements would be unfair, unnecessary, or simply obstructive. 116 Any regulation of private sector employers must similarly take into
account their differing practices in order to avoid unnecessary interference
with the efficient operation of their businesses. An approach that couples
general requirements with particular exemptions is a practical method of
fairly implementing principles of privacy protection when specific practices
cannot be isolated for regulation.
The Privacy Act is a more appropriate model than the FCRA because
federal agencies perform functions analogous to those performed by private
employers. The FCRA primarily regulates the dissemination of information
by credit agencies whose very function is to supply information to others. The
Privacy Act, however, imposes requirements on agencies that, like employers,
make varied uses and disclosures of the information that they collect. Both
employers and agencies use this information to make specific decisions about
employees or for other business purposes. This distinction is crucial because
certain requirements that are inappropriate to a supplier of information are
desirable in regulating a decisionmaker. It would be unfair to require a credit
agency to collect only relevant and necessary information because that would
require the agency to make separate, and virtually impossible, determinations
as to the needs of each user of a credit report." 7 An employer or government
agency, however, is in a better position to assess its needs for information and
111.

5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(3) (1976).
112. Id. § 552a(g)(1).
113. See notes 68, 71-73, 89 supra and accompanying text.
114. See note 102 supra.
115. See S. Rep. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15, reprinted in [19741 U.S. Code Cong, & AdNews 6916, 6929-30.
116. See generally Davidson, The Privacy Act of 1974-Exceptions and Exemptions, 34 Fed.
B.J. 323 (1975).
117. The FCRA c~ntains no provision comparable to the necessary and rele-ant standard of
the Privacy Act. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
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to promulgate standards for what is relevant and necessary for its purposes. It
is relatively easy for an employer or government agency to make such a
judgment because they both collect particular information that is necessary in
order to make the specific decisions that regularly arise.
The Privacy Act also supplies a superior analytical framework to the FCRA
for designing employee privacy legislation because it recognizes that the
information process is comprised of the four distinct stages of collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination. At each stage, different types of privacy
interests are implicated. 118 These interests are often ignored by the FCRA
analysis, which is primarily concerned with the dissemination of information.
Because an employee may be subjected to a wide variety of privacy invasions,
it is imperative that the framework for analysis be as inclusive as possible.
III. MODELS OF EMPLOYEE PRIVACY PROTECTION
Prior to 1977, there was a dearth of proposals concerning the protection of
the privacy interests of private sector employees. Two recent studies, however, have suggested methods to protect these interests and have proposed
far-reaching reforms. Because these models would certainly be influential in
the consideration of any legislation in this area, 1 9 they must be carefully
examined to determine their comprehensiveness in protecting the rights of
employees.
A. The Privacy Commission Approach
The Privacy Protection Study Commission was established pursuant to the
provisions of the Privacy Act to ascertain whether the principles and requirements of the Act should be applied to private sector organizations.' 20 The
Commission's report, issued in 1977, is a comprehensive study of the privacy
issues raised by the recordkeeping relationships an individual maintains with
various institutions, such as banks, insurance companies, credit card companies, and employers.1 21 Rather than attempting to propose an omnibus
solution to privacy problems in the private sector, the Commission chose to
treat each relationship separately and 2to2 propose a model of rights and
remedies for each type of relationship.1
Despite the specificity of many of its recommendations, the Commission's
approach is based upon a broad conceptual framework. The central principle
118.

See notes 14-23 supra.

119. Federal legislation incorporating many of the Privacy Commission's recommendations
have already been introduced. See H.R. 10076, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. H12,316
(daily ed. Nov. 11, 1977) (privacy protection for the subjects of credit, medical, tax, and
education records); H.R. 434, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 12.3 Cong. Rec. H192 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1977)
(prohibiting preemployment use of the polygraph test). Although H.R. 10076 includes many of
the Privacy Commission's statutory proposals, it does not include those proposals that cover the
employment relationship.
120. Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5(b)(2), 88 Stat. 1906 (1974).
121. A "recordkeeping relationship" is one in which decisions concerning an individual are
based upon information supplied either by the individual or a third party, such as a credit
agency, and the information is maintained in a manual or computerized file. See generally
Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 3-6.
122. Id. at 37-39.
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of the analysis is "to strike a proper balance between the individual's personal
privacy interests and society's information needs."' 23 All of the specific
recommendations ultimately flow from the Commission's perception of the
proper application of this balancing principle. The Commission also identifies
three broad policy objectives: (1) to minimize intrusiveness by creating "a
proper balance between what an individual is expected to divulge to a
record-keeping organization" and what information is actually necessary to
conduct the relationship; (2) to maximize the fairness of decisions made on the
of records
basis of recorded information; and (3) to grant the subjects
124
legitimate and enforceable expectations of confidentiality.
1.

Proposals for Expanding Employee Privacy Rights

The Privacy Commission enunciates eight general obligations of an employer to protect its employees' privacy. These obligations, which include
limiting collection to relevant information, allowing employees access to their
records, and limiting the dissemination of information about employees,' 25
are similar to many of the general principles of privacy protection established
by the Privacy Act. 126 Although the Commission's judgment that these
obligations should govern privacy measures in the employment context is
significant, it fails to provide more than a cursory analysis of how these
principles would actually apply to the employment relationship, and offers
few insights into the factors that were presumably considered in balancing the
interests of employers and employees. Moreover, the Commission's specific
recommendations are not always consistent with these eight general obligations. In some cases, therefore, it is difficult to determine which principles are
actually governing the specific recommendations.
a.

Intrusiveness

The Commission's first policy objective, to minimize intrusiveness, is the
subject of three specific recommendations that would ban the use of certain
techniques in collecting information. First, federal legislation should ban the
use of the lie detector and other "truth-verification" equipment because they,
are unreliable and prevent individuals from exercising control over the
information they divulge about themselves. 127 Second, the FCRA should be
amended so as to prohibit the use of pretext interviews because an employ2
ment check should not be conducted as if it were a criminal investigation. 8
Finally, the Commission proposes that when an employer utilizes the services
of a credit agency or other investigative firm to gather information about an
Id. at 3.
124. Id. at 14-15. The Commission points to the first amendment, law enforcement, and cost
as values that must be balanced against the three broad policy objectives. Id. at 21-28, see pt.
IV(A); infra; note 272 infra.
125. Id. at 237-38. The other obligations require employers to inform employees of the types
and uses of records maintained about them, to adopt reasonable procedures for maintaining
information, and to limit the use of information about employees within the company. Id.
123.

126.

See notes 102-12 supra and accompanying text.

127. Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 238-40; see notes 220-33 infra and accompan)ing text
128. Id. at 240. The Commission also contends that such information can be obtained
without resorting to concealment. Id.
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employee, the employer should have a legal duty of reasonable care under the
FCRA in the selection and use of these organizations. 129 Thus, an employer
who had knowledge that a credit agency used prohibited practices, such as
pretext interviews, would be liable for the credit agency's actions. 130
Although these recommendations are worthwhile, they can be criticized as
incomplete because they fail to discuss various techniques of collection that,
though perhaps not part of a formal collection process, are nevertheless
utilized by the employer. The Commission did not consider searches of an
employee's desk or locker, as well as audio or video surveillance of an
employee's actions or conversations. The emphasis on the collection of information during the job application process apparently caused the Commission
to ignore other intrusive techniques that occur during the course of employ13
ment. 1
The Commission can also be criticized because, although it proposes the
prohibition of certain collection methods, it makes no effort to limit the
extensiveness of an inquiry into matters that are legitimately within the scope
of an employer's concern. Faced with the fact that some type of inquiry by an
employer into an employee's medical history is appropriate, the Commission
avoids the crucial question of the scope of such an inquiry by characterizing it
as a "largely aesthetic" issue. 132 By so doing, the Commission contradicts its
central principle of balancing what an individual should be required to
divulge with what is required by the nature of the relationship. Its failure to
examine this question also undermines its proposed general obligation that an
employer collect only information that is relevant to specific decisions. An
inquiry about an employee's heart condition for a job that entails substantial
physical or mental stress is certainly relevant and appropriate. An inquiry
concerning the same job as to whether the employee has ever contracted
syphilis or had an abortion presents serious questions of relevance. To the
employee faced with the latter questions, whether they are permitted or not is
certainly more than an "aesthetic" issue.
b. Fairness
The recommendations that seek to maximize fairness in decisions based upon
recorded information, the Commission's second broad policy objective, comprise the bulk of the employment proposals. The Commission proposes that
employees should have rights of access and correction for most records, 3 3 and
34
that the disclosure of certain records to other employees should be limited. 1
These rights, which are also incorporated in the Privacy Act, 13-1 are valuable
and necessary.
129. Id. at 241.
130. Id.
131. The Commission also omits any discussion of the propriety of using personality tests
which are used in a manner similar to lie detectors as preemployment screening devices. See notes
234-40 supra and accompanying text.
132. Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 238.
133. Id. at 253-65.
134. Id. at 265-67.
135. See notes 106-110 supra and accompanying text.
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In seeking to maximize fairness, the Commission proposes limitations on
the collection and use of arrest, conviction, and military records. 136 The
primary criticism of this approach is not that the particular proposals are
unwise, but rather that it fails to establish any general principles of fairness in
the collection process. The focus on limiting only the collection of very specific
items of information implies the approval of other areas of inquiry. A
preferable approach, which would at the same time create a governing
principle of collection encompassing all types of information, would be to
recognize explicitly that fairness requires that only relevant and necessary
information be collected.
c. Confidentiality
Perhaps the most far-reaching of the Commission's proposals are those
seeking to establish a general duty of the employer to safeguard the confidentiality of employee records in its possession, the Commission's third policy
objective. These proposals, which require an employer to obtain the consent
of an employee prior to making many disclosures, 137 recognize the need for
the establishment of general principles from which appropriate exceptions can
be made. 1 38 They properly grant the employee control over disclosures that
affect him, such as sending letters of reference, but do not permit an employee
to interfere with disclosures when the privacy interest is minimal, as for
example when only directory information is involved, or when an employer
is
39
required by statute to disclose information about an employee.'
2. Implementation Strategy
Although the Commission makes wide-ranging proposals for the expansion
of substantive employee privacy rights, the force of most proposals is largely
negated by an implementation strategy that stresses voluntary adoption by
employers of the suggested rights.1 4 0 The Commission's primary rationale for
this approach is that "absent collective bargaining, there is no general
framework in the private sector which could accommodate disputes about
recorded information."' 1 4 ' The Commission reasoned that the lack of such a
136.
137.

Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 242-49.
The right of an individual to control the disclosure of information about himself is

perhaps the most fundamental element of personal privacy. See note 273 infra and accompanying
text.

138.

This is also the Privacy Act's approach. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.

139. Other important exceptions proposed by the Commission include disclosures made
pursuant to subpoenas and collective bargaining contracts. Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 273.
140. Of thirty-two specific recommendations, only seven suggest statutory provisions. Id at
239-40, 241, 243, 250-51, 258. The Commission appeared to rely somewhat on the fact that some
private employers are voluntarily implementing employee privacy rights. Id. at 233-34; see, e.g.,
Ewing & Lankenner, IBM's Guidelines to Employee Privacy, 54 Harv. Bus. Rev. 82 (SepL-Oct.
1976). See also D. Ewing, Freedom Inside the Organization 133 (1977) (reliance on IBM's privacy
guidelines); Metz, Privacy Legislation: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 34 Fed. B.J. 311, 311
(1975). The American Civil Liberties Union has criticized the Commission's entire approach to
the private sector by noting that the recommendations contain "general hortatory language
extending rights without remedies." Privacy in the U.S. Is an Illusion: Report, 63 ABA.J.
1363, 1363 (1977).
141. Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 225.
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framework within which employers could be compelled to meet their obligations would make it difficult to enforce any legislation governing employee

records. 142
The Commission established three general principles to determine the
appropriate method of implementing its proposals: (1) incentives should be
created for reform of privacy-invading practices by granting record subjects a
legal right to compel a recordkeeper to honor the subjects' substantive rights;
(2) existing regulations, particularly the FCRA, should be used to implement
recommendations; and (3) unnecessary costs should be avoided. 143 The Commission's emphasis on voluntary implementation is incompatible with its first
principle of implementation that incentives should be created for reform.
Absent the deterrent effect of a potential lawsuit to enforce rights, an
employer has little incentive to comply with the Commission's recommendations. Furthermore, the third principle of implementation, that unnecessary
costs should be avoided, would not be offended by an employee's right to
bring suit because the primary costs of this new litigation would be borne by
employers who fail to comply with the legislative standards. It is difficult to
classify these costs as unnecessary. 144 The Commission's conclusion thus
produces an internal inconsistency in the application of its own implementation alternatives.
An even more direct criticism can be made of the Commission's conclusion
that legislation would be difficult to enforce. The experience with other
legislation affecting the employment relationship, particularly the National
and
Labor Relations Act,' 14 and privacy legislation, such as the Privacy Act 46
the FCRA, presents a compelling argument that legislation is workable. 1 It
would appear that the Commission's preference for a voluntary adoption
strategy is designed to give employers time to adopt some of its more
controversial proposals, and is not based on47serious doctrinal opposition to the
concept of employee privacy legislation. 1
Although the Commission stresses voluntary implementation, it does endorse statutory enactment of some of its recommendations. These recommendations use the FCRA as a model "because it is the statute at the Federal level
that deals most explicitly and comprehensively with privacy issues in the
private sector.' 48 By using the FCRA, the Commission is following its
implementation principle of utilizing existing regulatory mechanisms wherever possible. This use of the FCRA, however, is misguided. The FCRA,
which was designed to regulate a particular industry that disseminates
142. Id. at 232-33. A minority of the Commission di!.agreed with the voluntary approach. Id.
at 233.
143. Id. at 30-31.
144. In explicating its principle of avoiding unnecessary cost, the Commission explicitly
supported the view that additional costs may be imposed on noncomplying organizations. Id. at
31.

145. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
146. See notes 190, 208 infra.
147. "The Commission does, of course, recognize that a voluntary approach may not be
effective." Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 232-33; see id. at 239-41.
148. Id. at 31.
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information, 149 is stretched beyond recognition when it is used as an allpurpose private sector privacy statute. For example, the Commission proposes that the FCRA be amended to prohibit the collection of information
about an individual from third parties through a pretext interview, justifying
this approach as "a reasonable extension of the [FCRA's] goal of assuring that
subjects of investigations are treated fairly."' s This reasoning is faulty
because the FCRA's specific goal is to ensure fairness in credit investigations,
rather than fairness in all investigations. The FCRA, as a statute with a
specific target, is ill-suited to the broad and varying practices of employers.' sl
The use of the FCRA to implement employee privacy rights would inhibit
the development of a comprehensive legislative solution that would incorporate general principles of privacy law in the employment context. If the
employment relationship is unique, as the Commission contends in justifying
the reliance on voluntary adoption, 52 legislation should address itself to the
specific needs of that relationship.
B. The Ewing Approach
An ambitious proposal for the recognition of a wide range of employee
rights has been advanced by Professor David Ewing of the Harvard Business
School. 15 3 The central thesis of the Ewing model is that private sector
employees should be afforded quasi-constitutional rights of speech, privacy,
and due process.' 5 4 The underlying justification for applying these constitutional principles to the private sector is that large corporations exert great
control over the lives of their many employees and thus may be characterized
as "minigovernments.' ' 5 5 Ewing does not argue that the activities of large
private sector employers constitute state action.' 56 Rather, he constructs the
149. The FCRA's statement of findings specifically refers to the role of credit agencies, their
role in commerce, and the need to regulate their activities to ensure privacy for the consumer. 15
U.S.C. § 1681(a)-(b) (1976).
150. Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 240.
151. See notes 91-92 supra and accompanying text.
152. Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 224-25, 232-33.
153. D. Ewing, Freedom Inside The Organization (1977) [hereinafter cited as Ewing Book).
Ewing has also published several articles that evaluate the attitudes of businessmen towards
proposals for increasing employee rights. See Ewing, What Business Thinks About Employee
Rights, 55 Harv. Bus. Rev. 81 (SepL-Oct. 1977); Ewing, Who Wants Employee Rights?, 49
Harv. Bus. Rev. 22 (Nov.-Dec. 1971); Ewing, Who Wants CorporateDemocracy?, 49 Harv. Bus.
Rev. 12 (Sept.-Oct. 1971). For criticisms of Ewing's analysis, see Lynd, Book Review, 87 Yale
L.J. 885 (1978); McLanahan, Book Review, 4 Employee Rel. L.J. 143 (1978).
154. "U.S. society is a paradox. The Constitution and Bill of Rights light up the sky over
political campaigners, legislators, civic leaders, families, church people, and artists. But not so
over employees. The employee sector of our civil liberties universe is more like a black hole, with
rights so compacted, so imploded by the gravitational forces of legal tradition, that, like the giant
black stars in the physical universe, light can scarcely escape." Ewing Book, supra note 153, at S.
155. Id. at 11-16. The Privacy Commission also focused on the activities of the largest
corporations. Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 224. Because Ewing relied so heavily on the
analogy between large corporations and government, his list of quasi-constitutional rights may
not be applicable to small- or medium-sized employers. The Privacy Commission's recommendations also may not be applicable to smaller employees. See id.
156. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
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"minigovernment" principle to argue that large employers should be subject to
requirements analogous to those imposed on actual governments by the

Constitution, requirements
that may be implemented either voluntarily, judi157

cially, or by legislation.
A key characteristic of Ewing's proposals is that they are based upon a
survey polling the attitudes of executives, supervisors, and other managers. 5 8
Although this empirical basis has generated criticism of the model on the
ground that its proposals are framed by the attitudes of management, 159 it can
also be regarded as one of its chief strengths. The survey reveals a surprising
receptiveness of management to employee privacy interests and rebuts the
common presumption that business is unalterably opposed to privacy measures. 160
1. Substantive Employee Privacy Rights
The core of Ewing's entire analysis is a proposed employee bill of rights. 161
In many respects, his privacy recommendations are similar to those of the
Privacy Commission. Ewing proposes that the use of lie detectors be prohibited, that an employee have a right of access to most of the information in his
file, that no information be disclosed about an employee without his consent,

157. Ewing Book, supra note 153, at 150, 198, 203.
158. See Ewing, What Business Thinks About Employee Rights, 55 Harv. Bus. Rev. 81
(Sept.-Oct. 1977); Ewing, Who Wants Employee Righ',s?, 49 Harv. Bus. Rev. 22 (Nov.-Dec.
1971); Ewing, Who Wants Corporate Democracy?, 49 Harv. Bus. Rev. 12 (Sept.-Oct. 1971).
159. Lynd, supra note 153, at 894. Ewing's concern with the effect of employee rights on
business is illustrated by a chapter entitled "Are Employee Rights a Threat to Capitalism?"
Ewing Book, supra note 153, at 61-73. Lynd's criticism of Ewing's managerial outlook loses some
of its force after consideration of this chapter, in which Ewing makes the hardly managementoriented suggestion that "the rights of private ownership, while important, must be qualified." Id.
at 61. This concept of ownership would require as an element of legal title that corporations be
accountable to the general public. Id. at 61-65. Although Ewing's citation to Henry Ford as
authority for this view does tempt one to infer, as Lynd does from the analysis generally, that
Ewing is harkening back to the days when corporate paternalism was part of the battle against
unionism, the emphasis on corporate accountability to ,ociety, rather than merely to individual
employees, suggests that the criticism is facile. This is not to imply that Ewing is antimanagement. In fact, Ewing supports his argument on the ground that it is "not likely to threaten the
capitalistic bottom line." Id. at 66-68.
160. The survey discovered that: (1) 94% of the businessmen surveyed favored a policy
forbidding the external disclosure of information about an employee without his consent; (2) 87%
favored granting employees access to files, except for confidential opinions or qualifications for
promotion; and (3) 61% favored limiting the availability of nonjob-related information, such as
the employee's financial condition and nonjob-related mcdical problems, to the personnel department, and that such information should be unavailable to work supervisors. Ewing, What
Business Thinks About Employee Rights, 55 Harv. Bus. Rev. 81, 86 (Sept.-Oct. 1977).
Business interests have, of course, frequently objected to possible privacy legislation. See, e.g.,
Bagley, supra note 90, at 52 (discussing the vehement objections of Rockwell International,
Forest Lawn, and TRW/Credit Data, among others, to a proposed California omnibus bill to
protect privacy). Ewing's survey does not suggest that corporations will not continue to object,
but rather that the attitudes of individual businessmen reveal that, whatever the corporate
position, certain measures are not considered unreasonable by those who would be faced with
administering them.
161. Ewing Book, supra note 153, at 144-51.
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and that the availability
of the information to other employees within the
162
company be restricted.
Although Ewing's analysis is generally less comprehensive than the Privacy
Commission's, in certain areas the proposals are more extensive. In particular, Ewing considers the scope of objectionable techniques of collecting
information to be much broader than did the Privacy Commission 163 and
would limit the use of personality and general intelligence tests, as well as the
lie detector. 164 Tests that measure narrowly defined skills would be permitted. 165 He also proposes that fourth amendment standards be applied to
an employer's search of an employee's desk or personal office files.' 66 These
proposals provide a broader and more descriptive conception of the range of
employee privacy interests than that provided by the Privacy Commission.
2. Implementation Strategy
Ewing's approach to implementation of the proposed substantive employee
rights proceeds on three levels. First, he favors voluntary implementation of
his proposed bill of rights.' 67 Consistent with the use of constitutional
principles throughout his analysis, Ewing also proposes various types of
hearing procedures, such as company courts, advisory boards, ombudspeople,
and arbitration, to process complaints of violations of an employee's rights. 168
Ewing envisions the voluntary establishment of these forums, and that the
particular forum chosen will depend on the employer's overall personnel
169
procedures and his attitudes towards personal privacy.
Finally, Ewing suggests that legal remedies ought to be available. The
remedies, however, would be used only when the preferred voluntary methods fail. 170 The remedies suggested are threefold. Primary reliance is placed
upon federal legislation' 7' that he proposes which would reject the concept of
terminability at will and replace it with a "law of abusive discharge."' 172 This
162. Id. at 134-37. In making his proposals, Ewing relies heavily on the privacy guidelines
instituted by IBM. Id. at 133. See generally Ewing & Lankenner, IBAF's Guidelines to Employee
Privacy, 54 Harv. Bus. Rev. 82 (Sept.-Oct. 1976).

163. The Privacy Commission's recommendations to minimize intrusiveness discussed only lie
detectors, pretext interviews, and the use of credit agencies or other investigative firms. See notes
127-31 supra and accompanying text.
164. Ewing Book, supra note 153, at 135.
165. For example, Ewing would permit typing tests for secretaries and, for prospective
magazine editors, a sample article to edit. Id.
166. Id.
167. Although he never offers an explanation for this view, his preference for voluntary
ights for employees.') (emphasis added), 198-99.
168.

Id.

at 157-60, 162-72.

169. "Due process does not have to be legal in the sense that it is enforced by the courts,
arbitration agencies, or other outside authorities. It does not have to be the same in detail from
one organization to another." Id. at 156-57.
170.
171.

Id.
Id.

at 199.
at 203.

172. Id. at 200-04. "Abusive discharge" and "unjust dismissal" are terms that describe the
termination of an "at will" employee for reasons that should arguably provide the employee with
a cause of action against his former employer. See Blades, supra note 1, at 1413; Summers, supra
note 3.
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would permit an employee who is discharged as a result of exercising, or
seeking to exercise, the substantive rights proposed to sue his employer in an
administrative tribunal for damages and reinstatement. 173 Second, Ewing
proposes the federal chartering of corporations, with each corporation being
required, as a precondition of incorporation, to adopt his employee bill of
rights. 174 Third, in some extreme cases, a court could order an employer to
change its practices when the employer's practices threaten continued violations of employee rights, such as where no efforts are made to adopt
175
procedures to protect those rights.
The advantage of the Ewing implementation strategy over that of the
Privacy Commission is that, while encouraging employers to adopt voluntary
procedures, it recognizes that a legal remedy may be necessary in some
situations. Its weakness is that only the first legal remedy, the cause of action
for "abusive discharge," grants individual relief to an employee. If an
employer denies other rights to an employee, such as refusing to grant access
to a personnel file or disclosing information without an employee's consent, and
the voluntary procedures of company courts or advisory boards do not uphold
the employee's right of access, the employee is left without legal recourse. An
action for abusive discharge, while a proposal of major significance, simply
does not cover the majority of situations where privacy rights may be violated
but discharge is not threatened. This gap in Ewing's proposal can be traced to
his failure to propose that the employee's rights be enacted into law. 176 An
employee obviously cannot be given the right to sue when an employer has
not violated any legal requirement.
Ewing's analysis, like that of the Privacy Commission, is basically a scheme
of general rights with neither an effective method of compelling employer
compliance nor a comprehensive remedy for employees when violations occur.
Furthermore, the proposals are set forth without a sufficient analytical
presentation to determine their validity. 177 Thus, a comprehensive theory of
employee privacy that can justify judicial or legislative intervention is
lacking. In addition to merely listing recommended employee rights, such a
theory must analyze the interests of the employer as well as the employee,
conceive of and explicate the range of practices that may violate privacy, and,
taking into consideration existing privacy legislation, as well as other legislation affecting the employment relationship, suggest a scheme of rights and
remedies that can protect against infringements of employee privacy.
173. Ewing Book, supra note 153, at 200, 206. Under Ewing's proposal, federal courts
would hear only appeals. Id. at 206. A tort, rather than contract, measure of damages would be
used to permit the awarding of punitive damages which would serve as a deterrent against
especially egregious practices. Id. at 201-02.
174. Id. at 205-06.
175. Id. at 209-10.
176. Ewing does, however, suggest that a company's adoption of these rights might be made
a prerequisite under a federal incorporation statute, a proposal that is not elaborated on. See
note 174 supra and accompanying text.

177. Ewing does consider generally whether an employee bill of rights is a threat to
employer's interests. Ewing Book, supra note 153, at 61-73. This consideration of employer
interests is not presented, however, when the specific recommendations for employee privacy are
set forth.
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IV.

A

PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATION

As prior discussion has demonstrated, the privacy invasions that are
characteristic of the employment relationship are generally not protected
against by existing privacy law.178 Protection against these invasions thus
requires either a radical judicial reinterpretation of entrenched concepts, such
as consent, publicity, and state action, or a legislative solution. The obvious
1
legal obstades to the former approach indicate that legislation is preferable. 79
The power of Congress to protect the privacy rights of private sector
employees cannot be seriously questioned. Numerous existing statutes affecting the employment relationship have been upheld as valid exercises of
congressional power under the commerce dause.180 The protection of privacy
would also be a proper legislative objective. As the Eighth Circuit noted in
upholding the constitutionality of the FCRA, the "statute supports and
protects a significant personal right, the right to privacy."' 8 The most serious
178. See pt. II supra.
179. Despite the Privacy Commission's failure to endorse legislation, some type of legislation
governing privacy in the employment relationship is likely in the foreseeable future. See Murg &
Maledon, Privacy Legislation-Implicationsfor Employers, 3 Employee Rel. L.J. 168, 176
(1977); Note, Let Industry Beware: A Survey of Privacy Legislation and its Potential Impact on
Business, 11 Tulsa L.J. 68, 69 (1975). See generally, Westin, An Era of Regulation, in Privacy (A

Summary of a Seminar on Privacy) 47-49 (Council of State Governments ed. 1975).
Separate federal legislative treatment of the employment relationship will continue the trend,
exemplified by the FCRA and the Buckley Amendment, to devise specific solutions to the privacy
issues presented in particular areas of the private sector. The difficulty in drafting legislation that
encompasses many recordkeeping relationships was a major reason why the Privacy Act was
applied to neither state and local governments nor the private sector. See Sen. Rep. No. 1183,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6916, 6934.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114-15 (1941) (upholding the wage and
hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, §§ 1-19, 52 Stat. 1060 (current
version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970 & Supp. 1975) (amended 1977))); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 310 U.S. 1, 7 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act). The
rights that Congress seeks to protect need not be commercial ones, but rather may specifically
relate to the welfare of employees and may have a very indirect effect on interstate commerce.
'ITlhe post-Jones & Laughlin cases adopt a concept of causation so attenuated as to bring within
the commerce power virtually all economic activity in the nation." Schwartz, National League of
Cities v. Usery-The Commerce Power and State Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 Fordham L. Rev.

1115, 1120 (1978); see Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255-57 (1964)
(upholding legislation prohibiting discrimination in public accommodation on basis that motel's
guests were engaged in interstate trips); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. at 114-15 (upholding
wage and hour regulations because Congress can prevent the flow in interstate commerce of
"goods produced under substandard labor conditions"). Since the expansion of the commerce
power in Jones & Laughlin, the only case to hold that Congress exceeded its commerce power has
been National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (extension of minimum wage
guidelines to state employees is a violation of state sovereignty).
181.
llstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829, 833 (8th Cir. 1976). Employers
might contend that the various requirements imposed by privacy legislation would deprive them
of their property rights without the due process required by the fifth amendment. Regulations of
business to further the public welfare, however, have consistently been upheld as long as they are
a rational exercise of legislative power. See, e.g., California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S.
21, 45-46 (1974); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-60 (1964). The
New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a statute prohibiting the use of lie detectors, noting that
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challenge to legislation is not whether it will meet constitutional requirements,
but whether it can strike a fair balance between the privacy interests of
employees and the business interests of employers.
A.

Interests of the Employer

All regulation of business activities entails costs for the party that must
adapt its practices to the legislated standards. Whether such costs outweigh
the benefits to be derived from the regulation is a matter of balancing
competing public policy values. 182 In the privacy area, the benefits to
employees of eliminating privacy-invading practices include a greater sense of
personal autonomy, better psychological health, facilitated personal development, and a context in which love, friendship, and trust are fostered. 183 The
interests of employers that may foreseeably be affected by privacy legislation
must also be considered in order to determine what practices can be proscribed without an unacceptably harsh impact.
1. Monetary Costs of Compliance
The potential cost of privacy legislation to employers cannot be predicted
with precision. 184 Although it is certain that privacy legislation would directly
cause significant expenditures to some employers,' 85 the key question is the
acceptability of such costs relative to the benefits that will be conferred on
employees. 18 6 The question is really threefold: (1) What types of costs can
properly be attributed to privacy legislation? (2) How can those costs be
justified? (3) What effect will specific statutory provisions have on costs?
Employers have argued that legislation would require prohibitively expensive modifications of their computer or manual data systems.' 87 It has been
noted, however, that the types of costs properly attributable to legislation are
limited.18 8 Expenditures for the protection of privacy-those seeking to
ensure that only accurate, relevant, and timely information is collected, used,
and disclosed-should not include the costs of ensuring the confidentiality of
information maintained by an employer, because the latter is a cost of the
private property rights are not absolute and may be infringed upon if the particular statute
reflects a reasonable balance between an employer's rights and an employee's interest in privacy.
State v. Community Distribs., Inc., 64 N.J. 479, 486, 317 A.2d 697, 698-99 (1974).
182. See Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 21-29; Greguras, Informational Privacy and the
Private Sector, 11 Creighton L. Rev. 312, 313-15 (1977).
183. See note 41 supra.
184. See Ware, Panel on Systems Cost and the Economic Impact of Implementing Privacy
Legislation, in Privacy (A Summary of a Seminar on Privacy) 40 (Council of State Governments
ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Economic Impact].
185. Id.
186. Professor Ewing has concluded that implementing his proposals for employee constitutionalism will not threaten profits. Ewing Book, supra note 153, at 66-68.
187. See Privacy Hearings, supra note 92, at 525, 528, 667; Bagley, supra note 90, at 52. A
contention that the cost burden of legislation violated the employer's due process rights would
probably not present a formidable constitutional argument. Other statutes have withstood such
an attack. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 50 (1974); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 260 (1964).
188. Economic Impact, supra note 184, at 41.
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information system itself. As stated by Dr. Willis Ware, a member of the
Privacy Commission:
Any information system should have safeguards against accidental or malicious
damage or misuse of the information it contains, because its very existence indicates
that it is relevant and critical to the appropriate functioning of the organization that
maintains it. Thus, information system security should be charged to the basic purpose
for which the system exists, even though the security measures contribute to protection
of privacy. In systems with wel-developed security measures, additional requirements
for privacy protection are likely to be of modest cost. In systems with lax security,
greater levels of expenditure obviously will be necessary.18 9
Thus, the cost of security must be distinguished from those costs imposed by
establishing procedures for employee access to information and consent to
disclosure, the true costs of privacy legislation.
The costs of implementing privacy legislation are also typically overestimated by including improvements in information systems that are only
collateral to privacy protection, and by allowing an unnecessarily large
margin for uncertain contingencies. 19 0 This point, and the above distinction
between information system security and other privacy measures, convey the
same general idea: true costs of privacy legislation are less than the total costs
that an employer will incur as a result of such legislation.
Even if such a limited cost approach were utilized, the cost of implementing
privacy legislation would still not be insignificant. Employers might be
required to alter their personnel procedures and to hire privacy coordinators
to handle requests for access and correction and to process consents to
disclosure.191 Although it is certainly possible to posit a level of cost that
would render legislation an undue burden to employers and the economy as a
whole, significant expenditures below this threshold can still be viewed
broadly as a proper cost of protecting an important interest of society. The
cost of environmental legislation, 92 for example, though not free from
debate, represents a major investment for many companies, but is acceptable
because the legislation protects important individual and societal interests in
health and natural resources. The protection of privacy is also recognized as
an important value in our society. 193 As technological innovations expand the
capabilities for privacy invasion, the protection of this value will require some
costly changes. These costs can be viewed as a proper
way of regulating the
1 94
undesired externalities of a developing technology.
189. Id.
190. Id. The actual costs of implementing the Privacy Act were much less than had originally
been expected. Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 500. The costs to educational institutions of
implementing the Buckley Amendment have thus far proved to be reasonable. Id. at 418;
Cudlipp, The Family EducationalRights and Privacy Act Two Years Later, 11 U. Rich. L. Rev.
33, 40 (1976).
191. See Economic Impact, supra note 184, at 42.
192. See id. at 40.
193. Congress has declared that "the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right
protected by the Constitution .... " Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(a)(4), 88 Stat.
1896 (1974).
194. See Economic Impact, supra note 184, at 40. "Concededly most of the scientific endeavors
of the recent past constitute advances and have aided measurably in the improvement of
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Cost, although not an absolute barrier to legislation, should be considered
in designing specific statutory provisions. 195 For example, provisions requiring notification before records are established or disclosed would be expensive. 196 Therefore, in the interest of minimizing costs, these rights could be
limited.1 97 On the other hand, provisions for employee access to records and
rights of correction, though expensive to implement,198 will ultimately benefit
the employer by assisting it in ensuring the accuracy of its personnel
information. Monetary costs of access procedures could be further offset by
charging a reasonable fee to an employee who utilizes these procedures.199
This would be a fair way of spreading the costs of legislation because an
access request is not an indication that the employer has violated any of its
employee's privacy rights. If correction of an employee's record is required,
however, the cost should be borne by the employer because it is more likely to
reflect improper recordkeeping procedures. Rather than simply accepting or
rejecting particular employee rights because of cost, the employer's interest in
minimizing expenses should be recognized and utilized as a factor in tailoring
the specific requirements of each provision.
2. Security
Employers have a vital interest in maintaining the security of their businesses against theft by employees. 200 For retail stores, losses due to employee
theft are substantially greater than those caused by shoplifting. 20 1 An employer has a definite need to obtain information that will enable it to make
personnel decisions that will minimize the chances of theft. 20 2 As a result,
employers often justify the use of lie detectors, investigatory reports, arrest
and conviction records, and surveillance as a means of excluding a potential
culprit from becoming an employee or discovering the commission of a theft
20 3
by an employee.
Given the unquestioned severity of the theft problem of many employers,
privacy legislation should not require the employer to sacrifice security. In
considering the intrusiveness of certain methods of collection, however, the
civilization. But some of these may become the artifacts of tyranny if their utilization is not
stringently controlled." United States v. Perkins, 383 F. Supp. 922, 926 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
195. See Economic Impact, supra note 184, at 43; Bagley, supra note 90, at 31-52.
196. Bagley, supra note 90, at 51-52.
197. Under the Privacy Act, certain "routine uses" may be made without the consent of the
record subject. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (1976), discussed at note 110 supra and accompanying text.
The Buckley Amendment also permits an educational institution to disclose certain information
without the consent of the parent or student. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (1976).
198.

See Swan, Privacy and Record Keeping: Remedies for the Misuse of Accurate litforma-

tion, 54 N.C. L. Rev. 585, 605-06 & n.70 (1976).
199. Some existing statutes provide for similar charges. See Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552(4)(A) (1970); FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681j (1976).
200. See generally S. Astor, supra note 14.
201. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Crimes Against Business 6 (1976). All levels of employees,
from management to security, participate in such thefts. Id.; see S. Astor, supra note 14, at
12-13.

202. Indeed, employers may even be under pressure from insurance companies to adopt strict
security measures. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Crimes Against Business 7 (1976).
203. See S. Astor, supra note 14, at 65-66, 69-79, 89-101, 118-19.
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availability of sufficient alternative methods that are less intrusive, though

perhaps more costly, 20 4 should be determined. For example, most of the

information obtained through the use of lie detector examinations can also be

obtained by using investigatory reports and letters of reference. 20 S An employer may be forced to sacrifice the use of certain methods, and may even be
required to forego some of the specific information provided by particular
methods, but he should not be expected to sacrifice security altogether.
3. Efficiency and Personnel Decisions
All employers have a general interest in operating their businesses
efficiently. Reasonable measures that are designed to improve the functioning
of a business and are not directed at individual employees should not
ordinarily be prohibited. In Thonwas v. General Electric Co., 20 6 a company
had taken motion pictures to study the layout of its plant and to monitor the
movements of employees in performing their jobs. The court properly upheld
this procedure against a claim of privacy invasion by pointing out its value to
the company and the additional cost that would be entailed to use alternative
methods of comparable value. 20 7 Prohibiting this procedure could unnecessarily interfere with an employer's efficiency. The enactment of legislation
providing a subject with rights of access, correction, and control over
disclosures, however, would not appear to diminish significantly the efficiency
of an organization's operations. The experience under other privacy legislation
is that the affected organizations have been able to adapt to the disruptions
caused by the legislation with only minor impact. 20 8
A related employer efficiency interest is the interest in having adequate
204. At this level, the relevant employer interest is cost rather than security. Tiffany's claims
that it uses lie detectors rather than traditional background checks because they are cheaper ($25
to $40 for a lie detector exam and $50 for a background check). Quindlen, Polygraph Tests for
Jobs: Truth and Consequences, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1977, at Bi, col. 1. Compelling an
employer to use alternative methods may thus result in increased costs "but in that regard it is not
to be differentiated from the many costly regulatory business restrictions . . . ." State v.
Community Distribs., Inc., 64 N.J. 479, 486, 317 A.2d 697, 700 (1974) (upholding statute
prohibiting use of lie detectors in employment).
205.

See Hermann, Privacy, The Prospective Employee, and Employment Testing: The Need

to Restrict Polygraph and Personality Testing, 47 Wash. L. Rev. 73, 152 (1971); Comment,
Privacy: The Polygraph in Employment, 30 Ark. L. Rev. 35, 40 (1976) [hereinafter cited as The
Polygraph in Employment].

206. 207 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
207. Id. at 793, 799.
208. Under the FCRA, a subject of a credit report has a right to learn the "nature and
substance" of what is in his files and the sources of information. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1)42)
(1976). One large credit company that anticipated a "landslide" of such requests from persons
who had been turned down for credit experienced only a 0.2% increase over the requests made
prior to the enactment of the statute. A. Westin & M. Baker, supra note 21, at 137-38. Access
requests made pursuant to the Privacy Act have also not been overwhelming. Privacy Report,
supra note 8, at 508. Similarly, educational institutions have not been unduly burdened by the
access requirements of the Buckley Amendment. Id. at 417. One advantage of increasing
computerization is that access requests may be handled more easily. A. Westin & M. Baker,
supra note 21, at 258.
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information about employees to make intelligent personnel decisions.2 0 9 A
major bank has argued that unless personnel data is exempted from privacy
legislation, "the process of selection and promotion of employees will be
intimidated and hindered, resulting in a reduction of competence and productivity, and an increase in cost to be borne by the economy ...."210 Privacy
legislation, however, need not abrogate the employer's traditional discretion
in personnel decisions. Instead, it should be designed to ensure that decisions
are made on the basis of accurate, relevant, and timely information, with
access to personnel information limited to those having a need to know. 211 In
addition to promoting fairness in personnel decisionmaking, these objectives
may further benefit the employer by improving the efficiency and correctness
of personnel decisions.
B. Framework
The following proposal will utilize as a framework for analysis the four
distinct stages of the information process: collection, maintenance, use, and
dissemination. This classification has the advantage of tracking the usual
chronological flow of information and emphasizes the interrelatedness of the
privacy interests arising at each level. The framework underscores that if a
comprehensive solution is desired, isolated regulation of particular areas will
probably be ineffective.
1. Collection
The collection process encompasses two distinct issues: (1) whether certain
methods used by employers to collect information are so violative of an
employee's privacy that their use should be prohibited or limited; and (2)
whether employers should be barred from collecting certain types of information that are irrelevant, confidential, or likely to be used unfairly in personnel
or other decisions.
a.

Methods of Collection

The collection of information about employees has developed into a sophisticated process in which the employer has a vast array of technological and
psychological devices at its disposal. Methods of collection that unduly
intrude upon the physical or mental privacy of individuals should be regulated. In considering whether the use of particular methods should be limited
or prohibited, the values that underlie the
constitutional and common law
2 12
rights of privacy provide useful criteria.
209. Cf. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 181, 319 A.2d 174, 179 (1974)
(permitting at will employee to sue for wrongful termination could adversely affect the personnel
process).
210. Privacy Hearings, supra note 92, at 528 (statement of Chase Manhattan Bank).
211. See pt. IV(B)(3)(a) infra.
212. "The character of the problems posed by psychological testing, the polygraph and
electronic storage of personal data can better be grasped if seen in the perspective of the common
law intrusion and disclosure cases." Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An
Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 1006 (1964). Several commentators have argued
that, if the state action problem could be surmounted, the use of the lie detector can be viewed as
a violation of the fourth and fifth amendments. See, e.g , Hermann, supra note 205, at 128-37;
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The application form is, of course, a necessary device for gathering basic
information about an employee. The simple process of completing an application for employment, considered apart from the particular types of questions
asked, 213 does not reasonably implicate any personal privacy interests. Employers not only collect information directly from an employee, however, but
also may gather information from third parties. The most common practice is
to request reports from credit agencies that frequently are based upon interviews with friends, neighbors, and relatives. 214 The Privacy Commission has
made the valid proposal that an employer be required to notify an employee
of any such inquiry, whether the inquiry is conducted by the employer itself
or by a credit agency. 215 An employer would also be required to notify an
employee about the type of information that is sought and the collection
techniques that will be utilized, 216 and would be charged with a legal duty of
reasonable care in selecting a credit agency. 217 Such requirements recognize

that if users of credit reports are held legally accountable, they may exert
pressure on credit agencies to conduct their investigations with a minimum of
intrusive practices.
The search of an employee's desk, personal files, or locker presents a more
serious invasion of employee privacy. In considering the propriety of employer
searches, a significant distinction can be made between an employee's files
that are employment-related and his personal files or locker. In the former
situation, the files are maintained for the employer's benefit and are unlikely
to include personal information. Therefore, as Professor Ewing suggests, the
search of property likely to contain work-related information, such as desks,
should be permitted if a supervisor has an immediate need to find a particular
item of information. 2 18 In the case of the employee's personal files or locker,
however, an employer should not have a license to rummage through them
Markson, A Reexamination of the Role of Lie Detectors in Labor Relations, 22 Lab. L.J. 394, 400

(1971); The Polygraph in Employment, supra note 205, at 42-43. Constitutional privacy law has
also been applied to personality testing. Hermann, supra note 205, at 128-37.
The present analysis does not attempt any direct application of common law and constitutional
privacy law because of the many legal obstacles that are presented. See pt. 1(A), (B) supra. They
are employed by analogy, however, to reflect the present limits and concerns of privacy law. To
the extent that cogent arguments can be made that lie detectors and other means of collection
infringe upon interests similar to those protected by common law and constitutional privacy law,
the public policy arguments for their legislative prohibition are strengthened. See Committee on
Labor and Social Security Legislation, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The
Polygraph in Employment: The Consequences of its Search for Truth, 28 The Rec. 464, 475
(1973).
213. See pt. IV(B)(1)(b) infra.
214. Although the FCRA already regulates these reports, it provides insufficient regulation of
the employer because it imposes only minimal requirements on a user of a credit report. See notes
67-76 supra and accompanying text.
215. Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 241.
216. Id. at 250.
217. Id. at 241. The value of these proposals is diminished because they leave intact the
FCRA's exemptions from the general notice requirements those reports that are prepared for
employment purposes when the subject has not specifically applied for the job. IS U.S.C. §
1681d(a)(2) (1976).
218. See Ewing Book, supra note 153, at 135.
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2 19
simply because they happen to be maintained on an employer's premises.

In all cases, searches of places that are not ordinarily the repository for
work-related information should be forbidden. When criminal activity is
suspected, an employer should be required to contact law enforcement
authorities, who are bound to abide by the fourth amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The lie detector test is a common truth-verification device used by employers. 220 Although the accuracy of the test has been disputed, 22 1 the more
important question is, assuming that the test is accurate in most cases,
whether the widespread use of the lie detector presents such an impermissible
affront to physical and mental dignity and privacy so as to warrant its
regulation or prohibition. 222 The lie detector test is a broad review of an
219. See Craver, supra note 3, at 49 (1977). Professor Craver distinguishes searches of property located in a company container, such as a locker, and searches of property not so situated. He
would permit regular searches of the first variety as long as an employer promulgated rules to
govern the search. Other property could be searched if the employer had "probable cause to
believe that relevant evidence [would] be uncovered." Id. (footnote omitted). Because a restriction

on either type of search within the employer's premises will limit an employer's proprietary
interest, a distinction based upon whether or not property is located in a company container
seems unnecessary. A more appropriate classification is to distinguish between an employer's
business interest in employment-related information and property, and an employee's privacy
interest in personal information and property.
220. Approximately 200,000 private sector employees take lie detector tests each year.
Committee on Federal Legislation, New York State lar Association, Polygraph Testing In
Employment (Oct. 1974), reprintedin 123 Cong. Rec. H1867 (daily ed. March 8, 1977) (remarks
of Rep. Koch). The polygraph is composed of: (1) a corrugated rubber tube that is attached to the
subject's chest to measure the respiratory rate; (2) an inflated rubber cuff attached to the arm
that measures blood pressure and pulse rate; and (3) two electrodes attached to the hand that
measure the flow of electric current (galvanic skin response) as the rate of perspiration increases.
Comment, The Polygraph in Private Industry: Regulation or Elimination?, 15 Buffalo L. Rev.

655, 658 (1965).
New truth-verification devices continue to be developed. One such device is the Psychological
Stress Evaluator (PSE), which measures stress in a person's voice. A recent "advance" in thuis
device would allow an individual to be tested by telephone without his knowledge. Telephone
Voice Analyzer is Designed To Spot a Liar, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1978, at D1, col. 1. Another

device detects lies by observing split-second facial expressions ("micromomentaries") which
supposedly occur when a person tells a lie. The inventor stated that " '[we know that a
psychopath, a psychopathic liar, can beat a polygraph test.... But to the best of my knowledge,
he can't beat this.. . .' [The inventor] has been besieged with requests from such diverse entities
as Sears, Roebuck Corporation and the United States Treasury Department to teach his
techniques ..... Teacher Says Videotape Detects Lies in Some FacialExpressions, N.Y. Times,

Sept. 25, 1977, § 1, at 20, col. 4; see Craver, supra note 3, at 29-30.
221. Compare Lykken, Polygraph Tests in Business Unscientific, Unamerican, Illegal, 44
Hennepin Law. 4, 28 (May-June 1976) with Ansley, Examiner Reviews Criticism by Psycholo-

gist, 44 Hennepin Law. 5, 31 (May-June 1976). Some courts have also questioned its reliability.
"[A]n innocent employee taking such a test could be risking loss of job and reputation at odds
similar to those in Russian roulette." Swope v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 159 So.2d 653, 654 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1964); accord, Livingston & Sons, Inc. v. Constance, 115 Ohio App. 437, 438, 185
N.E.2d 655, 656 (1961).
222. Many states have passed statutes that restrict the use of the lie detector. Such statutes
typically prohibit either requiring, demanding, requesting, suggesting, soliciting, influencing,
subjecting, or causing a job applicant or employee to take a polygraph examination. The type of
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employee's life under circumstances certain to produce anxiety, and its
intrusive nature has been well-documented. 2 23 The use of the lie detector
should be prohibited because it affects interests so closely akin to those which
already receive protection under the common law and constitutional privacy
rights. 2 24 The common law cause of action for intrusion protects against "the
obtaining of . . . information by improperly intrusive means. '225 Similarly,
under the fourth amendment, what an individual "seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected. '226 Under this standard, the lie detector test can be viewed as a
search that "strips the subject bare" and "invade[s] objective expectations of
'227
privacy.
The fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination provides a useful
analogy in analyzing the interests invaded by the lie detector test. The
restriction is indicated parenthetically below. Alaska Stat. § 23.10.037 (1972) (request or suggestion); Cal. Lab. Code § 432.2 (West 1971) (requirement or demand); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §
31-5ig (West Supp. 1978) (requirement or request); Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 704 (1975)
(requirement, request or suggestion); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 378-21 to -22 (1976) (requirement);
Idaho Code §§ 44-903 to -904 (1977) (requirement); id. Ann. Code art. 100, § 95 (Supp. 1977)
(requirement or demand); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 149, § 19B (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976) (subject or
request); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 338.1726(1) (1976) (requirement); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 181.75
(West Supp. 1978) (requirement or solicit); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 41-119 (Supp. 1977)
(requirement); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:170-90.1 (1971) (requirement, request, or influence); Or. Rev.
Stat. §§ 659.225, .990(7) (1977) (requirement); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7321 (Purdon 1973)
(requirement); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-6.1-1 to .1-2 (1968) (requirement or subject); Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. §§ 49.44.120-.130 (Supp. 1977) (requirement). The distinction between those states
that prohibit "requesting" the employee to take the test and those that merely prohibit "requiring"
such a test is significant. It has been held that an employer can request an employee to take a test
when the statutory language only mentions "requiring". 43 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 25 (1964).
New York has recently passed a statute that prohibits the use of the PSE on applicants or
employees. 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 30 (to be codified in N.Y. Lab. Law §§ 733-739).
223. See, e.g., A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom 154, 239-40 (1967).
224. Most commentators agree with this conclusion. See, e.g., Privacy Report, supra note 8,
at 239-40; Committee on Labor and Social Security Legislation, Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, The Polygraph in Employment: The Consequences of its Search for Truth, 28 The
Rec. 464, 465 (1973); Hermann, supra note 205, at 102; Markson, A Reexamination of the Role of
Lie Detectors in Labor Relations, 22 Lab. L.J. 394, 406 (1971). Professor Craver would prohibit
the preemployment use of lie detectors, but would permit its use in investigating employee
defalcations in some cases. Craver, supra note 3, at 36-37. The constitutional analogy used herein
is equally, if not more, applicable to the latter case because it is concerned with criminal contexts.
The employee's consent to the polygraph or other collection techniques, whether express or
implied, or whether given out of the fear of losing employment, precludes direct application of the
common law right of privacy. See note 54 supra and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the
oft-cited element of coercion that is presented in gaining the employee's consent, see, e.g., State v.
Community Distribs., Inc., 64 N.J. 479, 484, 317 A.2d 697, 699 (1974); Hermann, supra note
205, at 77, underscores the need for a legislative remedy.
225. Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969). For
an intrusion action analysis of the lie detector test, see The Polygraph in Employment, supra note
205, at 39-40.
226. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). In Katz, the Court rejected the view
that only tangible personal property is protected by the fourth amendment and found that an
intrusion into a property interest is unnecessary. Id. at 353.
227. Hermann, supra note 205, at 135.
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information elicited often includes prior convictions or criminal acts, such as
drug use, theft, or sexual offenses. 228 The virtually compulsory extraction of
such incriminating information by the physiological responses to the lie
detector can be compared to methods that have been rejected under the fifth
amendment. 229 Indeed, although the intrusion is perhaps not as shocking, the
use of the lie detector is closer to the pumping of the defendant's stomach 2 in
3
230
Rochin v. California that was found to be an unlawful forced confession 1
than to the fifth amendment's ideal of a voluntary and knowing confession
under nonintimidating circumstances. Moreover, in Schmerber v. California,232 the Court noted that the compulsory use of the lie detector yields the
type of forced testimonial responses that are prohibited by the fifth amendment.

233

The personality test is a similarly broad review of an employee's personal
life. In sharp contrast to limited vocational tests that measure specific skills,

such as typing,234 the personality test measures emotional adjustment, social
relations, motivation, and interests.2 35 Obtaining such information through
236
attitudinal responses can be considered a mental "search" for private facts.

228. See S. Astor, supra note 14, at 74, 76.
229. Hermann, supra note 205, at 130.
230. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
231. Id. at 172.
232. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
233. "To compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort will be made to determine
his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke
the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 764.
234. See Ewing Book, supra note 153, at 135.
235. Hermann, supra note 205, at 104. There are two types of personality tests. The first is an
inventory test that provides an objective measure of the subject's interest in certain types of
activities or of particular personality traits and is used to predict job performance. The Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) is the best known type of inventory test. ld. at 104-06.
The intimate facts sought by the MMPI are evidenced by the following questions which must be
answered true or false "without thinking or deliberation."
"C. Questions relating to family matters and social life
"Some of my family have habits that bother and annoy me very much.
"I loved my father.
"My relatives are nearly all in sympathy with me.
"My parents often objected to the kind of people I went around with.
"D. Questions relating to sexual matters
"I am worried about sex matters.
"I wish I were not bothered by thoughts about sex.
"When a man is with a woman he is usually thinking about things related to her sex.
"There is something wrong with my sex organs." Psychological Tests and ConstitutionalRights:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 169-70 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Psychological Hearings] (statement of
Monroe Freedman).
The second type of personality test is projective. The most common, the Rorschach ink blot
test, requires the subject to observe several types of ink blots and to describe what he sees In
each. Hermann, supra note 205, at 106-07. See generally id. at 102-14. For a summary of
objections to personality testing, see Psychological Hearings, supra at 187-89 (statement of A.
Westin).
236. "Personality tests seek to ferret out a man's innermost thoughts on family life, religion,
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Fifth amendment interests are implicated because personality tests ordinarily
require testimonial self-incriminations, as illustrated by the question, "Have
you engaged in any unusual sexual practices?1 237 In fact, the coercion,
anxiety, and scope of interests affected by personality tests are almost
identical to those affected by the lie detector. Its use, therefore, should be
prohibited for the same reasons. 238 This proposal is buttressed by the fact that
the fourth amendment requires that those methods of collecting information
that are less likely to invade privacy should be used before more intrusive
methods are employed.2 39 Applied to the employment context, the availability
of application forms, letters of reference, interviews, and physical examinations suggest that the more intrusive lie detector and personality tests
240
should not be permitted.
Fingerprinting, blood tests, physical examinations, and surveillance of
work areas 241 can be distinguished from lie detector and personality tests
because their scope of inquiry is not as broad. Fingerprinting, for example, is
"only a means of verifying the required information" and "involves no
additional intrusion." 242 The Court in Schmerber v. United States2 43 distinguished blood tests, fingerprinting, and photographing from lie detectors
because they are more closely akin to the gathering of evidence than to the
compulsory extraction of incriminating testimony.2 44 This distinction is
equally applicable to the employment context. An employer should be permitted to gather facts through the use of methods of accepted reliability that
seek to discover specific facts. A routine physical examination or blood test is
racial attitudes, national origin, politics, atheism, ideology, sex, and the like." Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323, 342 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted),

237. Psychological Hearings, supra note 274, at 176-77.
238. See Hermann, supra note 205, at 128-37 (analyzing both lie detector and personality tests
under the standards of constitutional privacy law).
239. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 569-72 (Stewart, J.. concurring) (1969).
240. Hermann, supra note 205, at 152; The Polygraph in Emplo.ment, supra note 205, at 40.
241. These methods have all been upheld as valid methods of collection. See Division 241,
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1029
(1976) (rules requiring blood and urine tests for public bus drivers after any serious accident or
suspicion of intoxication is not a violation of the fourth amendment because the state had a
reasonable objective in furthering public safety and the actual conditions and the manner of the
intrusion were not unreasonable); Thom v. New York Stock Exchange, 306 F. Supp. 1002
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (statute requiring fingerprinting of stock exchange workers held constitutional as
valid exercise of police power in combatting theft in the securities industry), aff'd per curiam sub
nom. Miller v. New York Stock Exchange, 425 F.2d 1074 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U S. 905
(1970); Thomas v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Ky. 1962) (taking motion
pictures of employees by an employer does not violate the employees' right to privacy when the
purpose was to study manufacturing methods and processes); Pitcher v. Iberia Parish School
Board, 280 So.2d 603, 607-08 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (requirement that public schoolteacher submit
to annual physical examination is a reasonable interference with the right to privacy), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 904 (1974).

242. Thom v. New York Stock Exchange, 306 F. Supp. 1002, 1009 (S.D.N.Y 1969), aff'd
per curiam sub nom. Miller v. New York Stock Exchange, 425 F.2d 1074 (2d. Cir.), cert denied,
398 U.S. 905 (1970).
243. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
244. Id. at 764.
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so commonplace that it can be considered neither an offensive prying nor an
invasion of any reasonable expectation of privacy. 245 The photographing of
employees in work areas can be a reasonable method for an employer 246
to
improve efficiency, and it only records what is already open to public view.
The objective of prohibiting or regulating the use of certain methods of
collection is to prevent the collection process from becoming an intimidating
ordeal. A job applicant or employee should not be required to bare his
innermost thoughts by submitting to methods that produce anxiety and
humiliation in an atmosphere of criminal-like interrogation. An employee's
personal property should not be open to employer searches merely because an
employer suspects wrongdoing. Furthermore, an employer should not be
permitted to conduct surreptitious background investigations by interviewing
an individual's close friends and relations. Requiring that the subject at least
be notified of such an investigation would seem a minimal protection that
would not be burdensome to employers. Absent legislation, many employees
may continue to be subjected to an inquisitorial process of collection from
which even criminals are protected by constitutional guarantees.
b. Types of Information
Limiting the types of information that an employer may collect requires the
establishment of two separate standards. The first should require that all
information collected be relevant to the purpose for which it is gathered. The
second should establish criteria for excluding specific types of personal facts
which, though relevant, are either so private that they ought to be beyond the
scope of inquiry, or are so prejudicial that they would be unfairly used in
making an employment decision. These facts would be deemed relevant but
unnecessary.
A relevance standard is already incorporated into the Privacy Act, 247 and
its extension to other contexts has already been proposed. 248 This standard
would prohibit the collection of information about political beliefs or sexual
preference. Obsolete information, which is regulated by the FCRA, 249 should
also be deemed irrelevant. 250 The judicial concept of job-relatedness 25' and
245. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957).
246. Under the common law action for public disclosure of private facts, for example,
whatever an individual voluntarily exposes to the public may be lawfully observed, and
photographs may be taken and disseminated. See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal.2d
224, 230, 253 P.2d 441, 444-45 (1953).
247. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (1976).
248. See Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation, Privacy in a Free Society 30
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Roscoe Pound] (proposing extension of relevancy standard throughout
the private sector); Hayden, How Much Does the Boss Need to Know?, 3 Civ. Lib. Rev. 23, 26
(Aug.-Sept. 1976) (proposing relevancy standard under the FCRA).
249. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (1976), discussed at notes 74-75 supra and accompanying text.
250. The FCRA does not include any relevancy standard. If an item does not fall within the
specific terms of the obsolete information section, the credit agency has a right to report the
information, regardless of its relevance. Herring v. Retail Credit Co., 266 S.C. 455, 456, 224
S.E.2d 663, 664 (1976); see note 79 supra. The proposed standard would not attempt to list
specific matters that would be deemed irrelevant, but would have the determination to judicial
decision. Like the Privacy Act's treatment of relevancy, specific exceptions could be made. 5
U.S.C. § 552a(k) (1976), discussed at note 102 supra and accompanying text.
251. See Craver, supra note 3, at 42 n.197.
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the requirement that questions be as specific as possible should also govern
252
the relevancy inquiry.

A more difficult question is presented when relevant information is sought
to be excluded. The value of relevant information to an employer in making
decisions must be assumed. Establishing criteria for determining what inquiries ought to be proscribed in order to protect privacy interests is difficult
because different individuals will deem different types of information to be
confidential. Allowing each applicant or employee to determine what types of
questions he can be asked would be an unpredictable and unworkable
restriction on an employer. Therefore, any legislative restriction of inquiries
into specific areas should require that the information withheld be: (1) matters
deemed to be private by a reasonable man (an objective standard of privacy);
and (2) matters that could be used unfairly in making personnel decisions.
Existing statutes that restrict the collection of records of prior arrests not
resulting in conviction satisfy these criteria. 25 3 The first criterion is met
because the ordinary man seeking employment would certainly prefer to keep
such facts private. The second criterion of fairness2 Sis4 satisfied because arrest
records should not be used as evidence of guilt.
An employer's present discretion in selecting the types of information that it
will collect may result in an overbroad disclosure of personal facts, political
beliefs, and associations.2 5 By limiting an employer's inquiry into those
matters that are relevant and necessary, the interests of an employer in
gathering needed information are recognized without permitting
an employer
25 6
the right to delve into every matter of an employee's life.
252. Employers are already prohibited from inquiring into irrelevant matters that could be
the basis of discrimination. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 659.030 (1977); 32 Op. Att'y Gen. Or.
17-18 (1964) (prohibiting an employer's inquiry into race, religion, color, or national origin). But
see Spencer v. Toussaint, 408 F. Supp. 1067, 1074 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (no privacy invasion by
inquiring about psychological history on application form).
253. See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 432.7 (West Supp. 1978); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 740
(1976). See also Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 243.
254. Limiting collection of information about past indiscretions, such as infrequent use of soft
drugs, is subject to a similar type of analysis. The argument against such a limitation is that the
principle of forgiveness has traditionally been an exception to a more fundamental principle of
personal responsibility. Therefore, the argument runs, the employer should have the right to

know such facts in order to treat individuals according to their deeds or misdeeds. A. Westin &
M. Baker, supra note 21, at 267-68. This argument does not take into account the unfairness
that may result by allowing an employer to base decisions on these matters. In Roberts v. Civil
Service Bd., 75 Mich. App. 654, 255 N.W.2d 724 (1977), the court, in reinstating a policeman
who had been discharged for smoking marijuana, stated that "[wlere we to similarly treat others
who, if known, have on occasion in their youth smoked marijuana, illegally drank liquor, ....
engaged in an illegal Saturday night poker game, or even participated in an illegal lottery, the
ranks of the police force and other important public service groups might well be significantly
reduced." Id. at 657, 255 N.W.2d at 726. But see Peller v. Retail Credit Co., 359 F. Supp. 1235
(N.D. Ga. 1973), aff'd mem., 505 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1974); Goodnough v. Alexander's, Inc., 82
Misc. 2d 662, 370 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1975), discussed at notes 78-86 supra and accompanying text.
255. At the constitutional level, the compelled disclosure of organization membership violates
the first amendment right of freedom of association. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
462-66 (1958).
256. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees Local 421 v. Schlesinger, 443 F. Supp. 431, 434
(D.D.C. 1978) (questionnaire sent to government employees requiring disclosure of "religious,

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

2. Maintenance
The maintenance of records involves procedures for storing and retrieving
personal information. From a privacy perspective, the focus is on designing
adequate safeguards to protect the confidentiality 2S7 and integrity of the
information maintained in an employer's recordkeeping system. Legislation
should require employers to adopt reasonable procedures to ensure the
security of records.25 8 If an individual suffers an "adverse effect," as, for
example, when a third party259gains access to private information, civil
remedies should be provided.
Another proposal that has been made for regulating the maintenance of
records would require an employer to purge his files of information after a
specified number of years have passed. 260 This limitation, however, would be
costly and unnecessary. As long as an employee is granted access to his file
and exeicises his right to correct or supplement it,261 he will be protected
against the use of obsolete information. Requiring an employer to keep track
of the length of time that many different types of information are maintained
and then to purge it would be an unnecessary inconvenience and expense,
particularly when provisions for access and limits on dissemination of information are provided.
3. Use
After an employer has collected and incorporated information into an
employee's file, internal use of the information begins. The scope of the use
category is the flow of information within an organization for various purposes, such as performance evaluations or determinations of eligibility for
fringe benefits. The use category consists of two related but analytically
distinct acts: (1) the disclosure of information to various individuals; and (2)
the decisions made on the basis of that information.
a. Disclosure
The internal disclosure of information in an employee's file to the personnel
department, the payroll department, or supervisory personnel is necessary for
social, political, educational, and fraternal associations" unconstitutionally abridges right of free
association).
257. Confidentiality is to be distinguished from privacy. "Privacy . . . is independent of
technological safeguards; it involves the social policy issues of what information should be
collected at all and how much information should be assembled in one information system.
Confidentiality is the central issue for which technological safeguards are relevant. Where an
organization has promised those from whom it collects information that unauthorized uses will
not be made ... making good that promise of confidentiality requires record security controls In
both manual and computerized files." A. Westin & M. Baker, supra note 21, at 393.
258. The Privacy Act requires that agencies establish "appropriate administrative, technical,
and physical safeguards to insure the security and confidentiality of records and to protect against
any anticipated threats or hazards to their security or integrity" 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10) (1976).
Agencies also must promulgate "rules ot conduct for persons involved in the design, development,
operation, or maintenance of any system of records" Id. § 552a(e)(9).
259. See id. §§ 552a(g)(1)(D), (g)(4) (damage action for failure to comply with any provision
that results in an "adverse effect on an individual").
260. See Roscoe Pound, supra note 248, at 31.
261. See notes 268-69 infra and accompanying text.
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a business to make its various decisions intelligently. Nevertheless, not all
personnel who need to review particular information about an employee
should have access to his entire file. It is simply unnecessary for a supervisor
preparing a performance evaluation to have access to information concerning
an employee's medical problems and financial history. Similarly, it is unnecessary for the administrator of a fringe benefit program, such2 62as health or life
insurance, to see an employee's performance evaluations.
Preventing such improper internal disclosures can be achieved by requiring
that disclosures be permitted only if made for a "routine use" to designated
personnel having a need to know particular items of information. Each
employer should establish "routine uses" for every type of information that is
either collected, such as financial information, or generated, such as performance evaluations. The acceptability of each routine use would be judged
according to whether it is compatible with the purpose for which the
information was collected. 263 For example, routine uses for a performance
evaluation would include decisions about promotions, raises, or discharge.
Routine uses for medical information would include decisions about hiring
and employee medical and life insurance plans. In manual labor jobs, specific
medical facts, such as physical strength, might be continually reexamined and
used to determine an employee's fitness for a particular job.
After determining what information can be utilized in making a particular
decision, an employer should designate those individuals who should be
granted access to particular information based on their "need to know.112 6 A
foreman and the manager or committee responsible for raises and promotions
might be given access to performance evaluations. The administrator of
various company insurance programs and the company doctor would have
access to medical information. 265 Limiting access to information based on a
"need to know" would not hinder the efficiency of an employer's operations,
and yet would provide an employee with valuable protection against indiscriminate disclosures within the company.
b. Decisionmaking
The second level of internal uses focuses on the decisions made on the basis
of information maintained by an employer. Although the first level is concerned only with the fact of disclosure, the second considers whether it is an
262. The Privacy Commission observed that "so long as there are no absolute barriers to an
employer's use of its employee medical and insurance claims records... a privacy problem of
potentially major proportions exists." Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 229. An employee
presently has no right to prevent such disclosures, assuming he is even aware that they might
occur, because he lacks a property interest in the records which are owned by his employer. Cf.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-41 (1976) (bank depositor has no property interest in
records about him that are maintained by a bank).
263. This definition is taken from the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7) (1976), discussed at
note 110 supra and accompanying text. The Privacy Commission has endorsed the application of
the routine use principle to internal disclosures by federal agencies. Privacy Report, supra note 8,
at 519.
264. See Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 265.
265. In Connecticut, arrest record information is only available to personnel department
employees. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 31-51i (West 1972).
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invasion of privacy for employment decisions to be made as a result of
inaccurate, incomplete, or irrelevant facts. It is at this level that the interests
of the employer in making employment decisions are paramount. An employee could be allowed redress for decisions made on the basis of inaccurate
information or information that a particular individual had no right to see,
but the possibility of disgruntled employees challenging every decision that
affects them under such a provision is both real and unacceptable. 266 This
would potentially bring almost all employment decisions under judicial
scrutiny.

267

A more moderate alternative, which has the same goal of preventing unfair
decisions, is to grant an employee the right of access to his file for the purpose

of making corrections or supplementations.1 68 It would be the employee's
responsibility to exercise this right of access. If he fails to do so and a decision

about him is based on inaccurate, incomplete, or irrelevant facts, he would be
precluded from directly challenging his employer's decisions. Exemptions to

employee access could be provided for information that was supplied by third
26 9
Existing
parties under an express or implied promise of confidentiality.
statutory access provisions have thus far not produced the deluge of requests
2 70
Access, therefore, is a workable procethat were predicted by opponents.
dure that will enable employees to protect their interests in fair decisionmaking without actually subjecting those decisions to constant outside scrutiny.

4.

Dissemination

Dissemination refers to the disclosure of information about an employee to
people or agencies outside the employment relationship. Internal use of
266. See Summers, supra note 3, at 524.
267. Nevertheless, a cause of action for the employee should be permitted when improper
information practices are a factor in his discharge. See pt. IV(C)(2) infra. Some state statutes
regulate specific employment decisions when they may unfairly invade a privacy interest of the
employee. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 338.1726(1)-(2) (1976) (employee cannot be
discharged solely because of the results of a polygraph test); N.Y. Correc. Law § 752 (McKlnney
Supp. 1977) (employment cannot be denied on the ground that an applicant has been convicted of
a criminal offense unless there is a direct relationship between the offense and the employment
sought, or if an unreasonable risk to safety or property would result). For an application of the
Michigan statute, see Roberts v. Civil Service Bd., 75 Mich. App. 654, 658-60, 255 N.W,2d 724,
726-27 (1977).
268. See Cal. Lab. Code § 1198.5 (West Supp. 1978); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 5, § 638 (Supp.
1977). Courts have not been receptive to nonstatutory access requests based on a privacy interest.
In Gotkin v. Miller, 379 F. Supp. 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), off'd, 514 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1975), a
former mental patient sought access to her medical records on the basis of a right to privacy
under the ninth amendment. The court not only refused access, but had difficulty in conceiving
how a privacy interest could be involved when no disclosure of the records was threatened. Id. at
863-64. This reflects the prevailing judicial interpretation of privacy as threatened by disclosure
but not recognizing the importance of the right of access. See A. Westin & M. Baker, supra note
21, at 19; Roscoe Pound, supra note 248, at 34.
269. Personal references would be the most common example. See Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §
552a(k)(5) (1976); Cal. Lab. Code § 1198.5 (West Supp. 1978). When an employee requests access
to particular information and an employer claims that the information is exempt, the court should
have the power to examine the records in camera to determine whether they should be released.
See Mervin v. Bonfanti, 410 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (D.D.C. 1976); 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(3)(A) (1976).
270. See note 208 supra.
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information about an employee is generally a necessary function of conducting
a business because it relates to promotions, reassignments, and work performance of an employee. Although employees will be affected by these internal
uses, the primary purpose is to benefit the employer by having people perform
work most suited to their abilities. External disclosures, however, are ordinarily discretionary 271 and primarily affect the life of the employee rather than
the operation of the business. They frequently take the form of references for
an employee seeking a new job or of data that is disclosed to credit agencies.
The adverse
effect of a negative dissemination may continue for many
27 2
years.

The right to control knowledge about oneself is probably the most frequently cited central principle of privacy.27 3 The most effective change in the
law would be to recognize this principle and grant an employee a legal right of
control over disclosures of personal information by his employer. 27 4 The legal
271. Nondiscretionary disclosures include responses to legal process, such as subpoenas, and
the reports required by numerous government regulations. See generally Murg & Maledon,
Privacy Legislation-Implicationsfor Employers, 3 Employee Rel. L.J. 168, 169-70 (1977).
272. See notes 78-86 supra and accompanying text. The Privacy Commission aptly summarized
the state of privacy law with respect to the disclosure of information about employees when it stated
that "[t]he confidentiality of [employee] records is maintained today solely at the discretion of the
employer and can be transgressed at any time . . . ." Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 269.
In nonemployment contexts, the subjects of records kept by others have generally been
unsuccessful in asserting a legal interest in those records. In United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976), the Court denied the subject a right to prevent disclosure because of his lack of a property
interest in records. Id. at 440-41. An alternative method of deciding the case might have been
to emphasize that since Katz v. United States, 329 U.S. 347 (1967), fourth amendment protection
has not rested exclusively on property interests.
Prior to Miller, a depositor traditionally had some legal expectation of confidentiality in
communications with his bank. Note, Bank Recordkeeping and the Customer's Expectation of
Confidentiality, 26 Cath. L. Rev. 89, 93-94 (1976); see Shapiro v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 84
Misc. 2d 938, 941-43, 376 N.Y.S.2d 365, 369-70 (Sup. Ct. 1975), appeal dismissed, 53 A.D.2d
542, 384 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1976). Since the decision in Miller, however, a depositor has no right to
prevent the disclosure of his bank records. See United States v. Blackwood, Nos. 78-1358 to
1360, slip op. at 4 (10th Cir. Aug. 28, 1978).
273. See, e.g., Note, The MassachusettsRight of Privacy Statute: Decoy or Ugly Duckling?, 9
Suffolk L. Rev. 1248, 1258 n.41 (1975).
274. One commentator has stated: "In developed societies, the only way a person may be
given the complete measure of both the sense and the fact of control is through a legal title to
control . . . . Privacy is more than an absence of information abroad about ourselves; it
encompasses a feeling of security in being able to control that information. By using the
impersonal, public and ultimate institution of law to grant persons this control, at once the right
to control is put far beyond question and at the same time indicates how seriously that right is
taken." Pipe, Privacy: EstablishingRestrictions on Government Inquiry, 18 Am. U. L Rev. 516,
519 (1969).
Limitations on the employer's right to communicate truthful information about an employee to
third parties might be challenged as a violation of the employer's right of free speech. See Privacy
Report, supra note 8, at 21-24; Greguras, Informational Privacy and the Private Sector, 11
Creighton L. Rev. 312, 313-14 (1977). Although the Buckley Amendment contains a similar
limitation on disclosure, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (1976), the Supreme Court has not been called
upon to determine its constitutionality. A relevant consideration in this determination is whether
most employer disclosures about employees are properly classified as "commercial speech."
Although this is an uncertain proposition because most commercial speech cases have dealt with
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principle underlying a right of control is the "expectation of privacy" that an

employee has in the records maintained about him by an employer.27 s An
employee, relying on such an expectation, should be able to assume that the
information collected about him by his employer will be used only within the

employing organization. 2 76 This expectation should form the basis
for a
277
statutory requirement of employee consent to external disclosures.

An employee's right to control disseminations should be qualified to permit
an employer to make disclosures without consent when an employer has

established routine uses for certain types of information and has informed
employees of those uses at the time that the relevant information is coladvertising, one commentator has asserted that employer references can be so classified, Comment, Qualified Privilege to Defame Employees and Credit Applicants, 12 Harv. C.R.-C.L. 143,
177-78 (1977). Although commercial speech has been afforded some first amendment protections,
see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976),
it still receives a lesser degree of protection than other forms of speech. Id. at 771-72 n.24. For
example, in Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976), the court found
credit reports to be commercial speech and sustained the constitutionality of the FCRA. The
court held that the right to communicate credit reports was outweighed by the protection
afforded "a significant personal right, the right to privacy." Id. at 833.
275. In California, a right of control based on such an "expectation of privacy" is recognized
for the subjects of certain records. See Valley Bank v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d
977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975); Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 166 (1974). This "expectation of privacy" has not yet been applied to the employment
context. California has advanced beyond most states in piotecting privacy. See Cal. Const. art. 1,
§ 1 (privacy is an inalienable right); Cal. Lab. Code § 1198.5 (West Supp. 1978) (access by
employees to their personnel files). The Privacy Commission has endorsed the California
approach, but only to the extent that a government entity seeks records about an individual from
a recordkeeper such as a bank or an employer. See Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 357.
Although the Privacy Commission also separately supports an expectation of confidentiality
against disclosures by employers to private parties, id. at 270-73, it is uncertain whether this is
merely a policy judgment or whether it is based on the California model.
276. Cf. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 449 (1976), (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A bank
customer's reasonable expectation is that, absent compulsion by legal process, the matters he
reveals to the bank will be utilized by the bank only for internal banking purposes.") (quoting
Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.3d 238, 243, 529 P.2d 590, 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 169
(1974)).
277. The proliferation of privacy statutes that limit disseminations indicates a general
awareness of the need to recognize the rights of the subjects of records as well as those of the
recordkeeper. In addition to the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1976), and the Buckley
Amendment, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (1976), several state statutes, though not granting the
general right of control provided by the two federal statutes, preserve the confidentiality of public
employee records. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-72-204 (3)(a)(l)-(II) (1973) (medical, psychological, and scholastic achievement data, personnel files, and letters of reference); Iowa Code Ann. §
68A.7(10)-(11) (West 1973) (personal information in confidential personnel records); N.Y. Pub.
Off. Law § 89(2) (a)-(b)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1977) (any information that would constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, including "employment, medical or credit histories or
personal references of applicants for employment"). Several states have also enacted statutes
that limit the dissemination of arrest records of private employees. See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code §
432.7(0 (West Supp. 1978); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 206-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); Me. Rev.
Stat. tit. 16, §§ 601-07 (Supp. 1977-78); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 739 (1976), Nevertheless,
statutes that protect only particular types of information fall to recognize the general privacy
interest of an employee in records maintained about him.
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lected. 278 A routine use would be deemed appropriate if it is made during the
ordinary course of an employer's business and if the disclosure is reasonably
necessary to the efficient operation of the business. An acceptable routine use
would be the disclosure to potential or present business customers of an
employee's skill, experience, educational background, and performance rating. Similar disclosures to the employer's consultants, attorneys, and accountants would also be permissible. These uses should be contrasted with letters
of reference or disseminations of information to credit agencies that are not
made in pursuit of an employer's ordinary business and are unlikely to affect
the efficient operation of the employer's business. Rather, the effect of such
disclosures is borne primarily by employees. A right to control these disclosures
is, therefore, particularly appropriate.
Routine uses would vary for each employer. Employers could not, however, abuse the provision by establishing an all-inclusive list of routine uses.
Gratuitous derogatory comments 27about
an employee could not be made a
9

routine use under any standard.

In addition to the routine use exception, a statute should enumerate specific
situations when disclosure would be permitted without an employee's consent.28 0 These exceptions would include, but not be limited to, reports to
government agencies, responses to judicial or administrative subpoenas, and
responses to specific requests for the fact, dates, and location of employment,
and the position held. 28 '
This statutory scheme recognizes a dual interest in employment recordsting legitimate business disseminations, which would be exempted as a routine
These provisions reflect a reasonable balance of the dual interests by permitting legitimate business disseminations which would be exempted as a routine
use from the employee consent requirement. At the same time, employees
would be protected from unwanted disseminations that could have a lasting
effect on their lives.
1.

C. Remedies
An Action for "Privacy Discrimination"

An employer presently "enforces" his information-gathering and recordkeeping practices through his right to discipline or dismiss an employee at
any time. 28 2 If employee privacy legislation were to leave this right intact, the
possibility of reprisals against employees exercising the rights granted would
be great and the legislation's value negated.283 Consequently, legislation
278. The Privacy Act has a comparable provision. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3)(C) (1976). See
generally Harper v. United States, 423 F. Supp. 192, 197-98 (D.S.C. 1976). For a discussion of
the routine use concept as applied to the use category, see notes 263-65 supra and accompanying
text.
279. See Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701, 713 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
280. This approach is modeled on the Privacy Act, which also couples a routine use
exception, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3)(C) (1976), with specific exceptions, id. § 552a(k).
281. The Privacy Commission has approved these exceptions, as well as several others. See
Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 272-73.
282. See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying texL
283. Indeed, the ]privacy Commission explicitly recognized this when it cited the possibility of
employer reprisals as a reason why legislation would be inappropriate. Privacy Report, supra note
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should provide a statutory cause of action to an employee who is not hired,
denied a promotion, demoted, or discharged as a result of seeking to exercise
his rights. 284 This "privacy discrimination" cause of action would deter

employers from interfering with an employee's rights to object to a proscribed
collection method, to seek access to his files, or to require his consent prior to
certain disseminations.
An employee who has established that he was discharged because of
exercising his privacy rights should also, depending on the particular circumstances of the case, be granted back pay and reinstatement. 28 5 An employee
who has been discriminated against in other ways short of discharge should be
able to obtain an injunction to prohibit the employer from continuing the
discrimination. In addition to such remedies, damages for privacy discrimination should be measured under a tort standard and thus include recovery for
injury to reputation and mental distress.2 86 In order to deter future employer
violations, punitive damages should also be available .2 87
2. Actions for Violation of Statutory Requirements
The failure of an employer to meet the requirements of an employee privacy
statute should be the basis for remedial action in three distinct contexts. First,
8, at 232. By creating a remedial mechanism within the legislation, the present analysis eliminates
this argument against legislation.
284. Smaller employers should not be subject to any remedial actions. The jurisdictional
standards of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which usually require a minimum
dollar volume for particular types of employers, could serve as a model for designing similar
limits on employee privacy actions. See, e.g., LaCrescent Constant Care Center, Inc. v. NLRB,
510 F.2d 1319, 1323 n.19 (8th Cir. 1975); San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary
Workers v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 794, 796-97 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 29 C.F.R. 103.1-.3 (1977). See
generally A. Cox, D. Bok & R. Gorman, Labor Law 97-98 (8th ed. 1977).

285. Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(1970), is closely analogous to the proposed cause of action. It provides that an employer may not
discriminate "in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." Id. Under § 10(c) of the
NLRA, the NLRB may issue a cease and desist order to the employer and may order
reinstatement of employees "with or without back pay." Id. § 160(c). Although the NLRB's
findings are usually accorded great weight and will be set aside only if unsupported by substantial
evidence, Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), a finding of reinstatement may
be overturned if an employee has committed criminal acts, threatens the safety of persons or
property, or disrupts the operation of a business. See, e.g., NLRB v. Apico Inns of California,
Inc., 512 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1975) (prior to discharge, the employee, a bartender, made profane
remarks in the presence of customers, drank while on duty, and made lewd comments to
waitresses and customers); NLRB v. Big Three Industrial Gas & Equipment Co., 405 F.2d 1140
(5th Cir. 1969) (employee, a truck driver, was an habitual violator of traffic laws). Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 also contains a provision that outlaws discrimination against employees
who exercise their statutory rights. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Supp. V 1975).
286. Damages for other forms of discrimination outlawed by statute are also based in tort
law. See Note, Damage Remedies Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 43

Brooklyn L. Rev. 47, 51-58 (1976). The action for prima facie tort, which focuses on the
defendant's bad motives, is appropriate in many cases of discharge, Blades, supra note 1, at
1422-23, and would be particularly so when a discharge or other discrimination is a reprisal
against an employee who takes advantage of his privacy rights.
287. See Ewing Book, supra note 153, at 201.
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an employee may be directly injured as a result of an employer's violation
when, for example, the employer wrongfully disseminates information to a
third party without receiving an employee's consent, and that information is
subsequently used as a basis for denying credit or employment to the
employee. 28 A job applicant also might be denied employment because of an
employer's wrongful requirement that he take a lie detector or personality
test. In these situations, a suit should be permitted to recover actual damages. 289 To encourage employees to exercise their rights, any plaintiff sustaining injury should be entitled to a minimum recovery. 290 Liability for actual
damages should also be imposed on an employer who negligently violates the
statute and thereby causes harm to an employee. 291 Thus, an employer could
not carelessly maintain his records and then claim lack of intent when injury
is caused by a negligent dissemination. For employers who intentionally
violate the statute, punitive damages should be available as a deterrent. 292
The second context of employer violations may occur when the employer
fails to comply with the statutory requirements, but no injury has been caused
to an employee. For example, if an employer refuses to allow an employee to
correct his record, or tells an employee to take a lie detector test, no damage
has yet occurred. Nevertheless, there is a strong probability of harm to the
employee. He should be permitted to sue for injunctive relief, requiring the
employer to produce the records sought, or enjoining the employer
from
293
requiring the lie detector test as a condition of employment.
The third context is similar to the second, except that, in this situation, an
employer's actions are part of a continuing practice or policy that violates a
requirement of the statute. An employer might have a policy of allowing
supervisors to review an employee's entire file or might require that all
employees submit information concerning their arrest records. Individual
288. See, e.g., Peller v. Retail Credit Co., 359 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D. Ga. 1973), off'd memn.,
505 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1974), discussed at notes 81-86 supra and accompanying text.
289. The Privacy Act and the FCRA permit similar actions. See Privacy Act, S U.S.C. §
552a(g)(4) (1976); FCRA, 15 U.S.C. 33 16 81n-1681p (1976).
290. The Privacy Act provides for a minimum recovery of $1,000. 5 U.S.C. § 552ag)(4(A)
(1976).
291. See FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (1976).
292. Under the FCRA punitive damages may be recovered without a showing of actual
damages, id. § 1681n(2), because they are designed "not to compensate the plaintiff, but solely to
punish the defendant." Ackerley v. Credit Bureau of Sheridan, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 658, 661 (D.
Wyo. 1974). The most important case on damages under the FCRA is probably Millstone v.
O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976). In Millstone, the plaintiff's car insurance
policy was cancelled after the defendant furnished a credit report to the insurance company that
falsely stated that the plaintiff was a "hippie," attended protest demonstrations, was suspected of
drug use, and was rumored to have been evicted from three places. The court awarded $2,500 in
actual damages, $25,000 in punitive damages and $12,500 in attorney's fees. Id. at 831.
Injunctive relief should also be available. Relief of this nature is common under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See, e.g., Stokley
v. Lewis Carpet Mills, Inc., [1977] 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
7592 (N.D. Ga. 1977)
(employees who were discharged as a result of discrimination obtained an injunction against their
former employer to prevent him from stating in any employment records that they were
terminated for cause).
293. See Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(3)(A) (1976).
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actions for injunctive relief would not sufficiently combat the threat of
repeated violations. A government agency, perhaps the Department of Labor,
should be given the power to sue an employer to obtain injunctions against
the continuation of such practices. 294 The threat of such actions should
provide an additional deterrent against employers which fail to abide by
statutory provisions.
CONCLUSION
Since the famous article by Warren and Brandeis in 1890, the law of
privacy has developed rapidly. It now includes four different types of common law actions, various constitutional guarantees, and a recent proliferation
of state and federal statutes. The exclusion of private sector employees from
these existing protections is inexcusable. The employee's privacy interests are
closely analogous to those interests that are protected by existing privacy
actions. The failure of privacy measures to protect employees borders on the
irrational because the employment relationship requires many employees to
submit to a more varied array of intrusive practices than almost any other
relationship between an individual and an organization in contemporary
society.
This Comment's proposal for comprehensive employee privacy legislation is
an effort to formulate a reasonable accommodation between the interests of
the employee and the very real, and often compelling, countervailing interests
of employers. The explication of the various interests of employers and
employees and the resolution of those interests presented should indicate that
the overdue task of recognizing a legal right of privacy for private employees
can be accomplished with fairness, manageable cost, and a minimal burden to
employers.
Martin N. Flics
294. This agency should not be given the power to promulgate rules and regulations that
establish procedures for employer compliance with the statute. The continuous intervention of a
government agency to monitor the internal recordkeeping practices of a private employer would
probably require employers to prepare numerous reports for agency review and would be an
unprecedented governmental invasion into the private sector. The avoidance of such recordkeeping requirements has limited the costs of compliance with the Buckley Amendment. See Cudllpp,
The Family EducationalRights and Privacy Act Two Years Later, 11 U. Rich. L. Rev. 33, 40
(1976). Furthermore, the intricate, complex, and probably inefficient bureaucracy that would be
required to oversee the recordkeeping practices of almost all private employers would be a
massive, and perhaps impossible, undertaking. See Privacy Report, supra note 8, at 232.

